



# **MADE TO MEASURE:**

THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF  
MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE  
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION IN  
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

September 2017





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## List of abbreviations

<b>ABCD</b>	Assumption Based Communication Dynamics
<b>CJI</b>	Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland
<b>CJS</b>	Criminal Justice System
<b>CSE</b>	Child Sexual Exploitation
<b>CTC</b>	Command and Tasking Centre (PSNI)
<b>DEA</b>	District Electoral Area
<b>DoJ</b>	Department of Justice
<b>HMIC</b>	Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary
<b>HMIP</b>	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (in England and Wales)
<b>KPI</b>	Key Performance Indicator
<b>KPM</b>	Key Performance Measure
<b>LSA</b>	Legal Services Agency
<b>NICS</b>	Northern Ireland Crime Survey
<b>NICTS</b>	Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service
<b>NIPB</b>	Northern Ireland Policing Board
<b>NIPS</b>	Northern Ireland Prison Service
<b>NISRA</b>	Northern Ireland Statistics and Research and Agency
<b>OBA</b>	Outcome Based Accountability™
<b>PACE</b>	Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989
<b>PBNI</b>	Probation Board for Northern Ireland
<b>PBR</b>	Priority-Based Resourcing (in PSNI)
<b>PCSP</b>	Policing and Community Safety Partnerships
<b>PfG</b>	Programme for Government
<b>PPS</b>	Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland
<b>PSNI</b>	Police Service of Northern Ireland
<b>SCU</b>	Serious Crime Unit (in Public Prosecution Service)
<b>SRO</b>	Senior Responsible Owner
<b>VCSE</b>	Voluntary Community and Social Enterprise sector
<b>YJA</b>	Youth Justice Agency



# Chief Inspector's Foreword

Protecting and respecting the independence of the criminal justice agencies comes at a cost to the taxpayer, victims, witnesses and offenders and to the organisations themselves who have developed strategies, policies and practice that reinforce their independence with the perverse consequence of limiting effective partnership working.

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Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJI) looked at this general subject area some 11 years ago and concluded that the criminal justice agencies were in general, mirroring the public sector service delivery approach to target setting and performance management. The issues identified in that report related to a lack of cohesion and urgency when cases, offenders, victims and witnesses were progressing through the criminal justice system and the perverse impact of some organisational targets on the overall performance of the criminal justice processes.

In the current fiscal environment service delivery is under increasing pressure to deliver public expectations. Simply doing it because that's what we have always done is no longer a viable approach to service delivery. We need to know that what we are doing works and our actions are making a measurable difference to the lives of our citizens.

Victims, witnesses and offenders are described as being at the heart of our criminal justice system. Yet their experience and journey is often lengthy and disjointed with seamless transfer across the criminal justice agencies being rather more of an aspiration than reality.

Outcome based accountability has the potential to radically change how the criminal justice system functions, but only if the political leadership matches the current rhetoric to encourage the public sector to work more collaboratively in the best interests of the citizen. As an Inspectorate we have been calling for more collaboration within the criminal justice system while at the same time recognising that many of the long term solutions to criminal justice issues lay with other government departments.



This report concludes that a vast amount of data is being collated, much of which will be realigned to support the planned outcome based approach to public service delivery. The challenge for criminal justice agencies will be to design effective measures capable of providing evidence that their activities and processes are leading to identifiable and quantifiable outcomes. I believe that the Criminal Justice Board is best placed to design and monitor the performance of the criminal justice agencies and at the same time, protect the concept of organisational independence as they pursue shared goals with clear outcomes.

This inspection was conducted by Dr Stephen Dolan, my sincere thanks to all who supported this work.

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**Brendan McGuigan**  
**Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice**  
**in Northern Ireland**

September 2017



# Executive Summary

CJI reviewed the provision of management information and performance management information across the Criminal Justice System (CJS). Individual Criminal Justice Agencies had invested in ICT infrastructure and staff resources to deliver timely and accurate data to a range of users. The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) provided high quality statistical data and also undertook a range of analytical exercises that added value.

Users of the information at Executive and non-Executive level expressed satisfaction with the information they received and the manner in which it was presented. There were a number of improvements suggested in the volume of data made available and the presentational array.

One area of concern was the transmission of information across the various CJS bodies. The independence essential to an impartial Criminal Justice System contributed to problems in the transfer of data mostly around transfers of people within the system. Although the Causeway system<sup>1</sup> transferred data between the CJS organisations, and did so effectively, it was not designed to provide analysis of the data and had a limited role in the provision of

management information. Where people were transferred between CJS bodies, information could be delayed or lost and in some instances information was overlooked either due to the volume of data being transferred or human error.

The inadequate linkages between the various bodies also had an impact on risk management processes. Whilst risk management was supported by extensive corporate risk registers and evidence of regular review, one criticism was that the management of risks was insular with the risks at the point of transfer between agencies not being sufficiently prioritised. A recommendation to review risk management in a manner that looks from the start to the end of a process was made.

<sup>1</sup> Causeway is a shared IT system established to allow for the exchange of information between the various justice agencies including the PPS, the PSNI and the NICTS.



Performance management for the most part focused on measuring performance indicators to meet certain targets usually presented as comparators between previous years with tabular or graphical displays. The CJS was effective in measuring inputs and outputs, reporting on activities achieved but less so in measuring the impact of its activities or achievement of outcomes.

Financial data included variance analysis against budgeted figures using year to date and end of year comparisons. The alignment of financial plans with activity plans was less developed with some concerns that there had been no progress made on this front. Performance analysis in Annual Reports emphasised achievement against a range of targets and formulated statements on compliance with governance structures and risk management.

The move to an outcomes based approach in the draft Programme for Government (PfG) 2016-2021 with the introduction of Outcomes Based Accountability™ presented a major challenge to the criminal justice organisations. The development of high level outcomes and associated action plans was well advanced, although some of the performance measures belonged to the previous target oriented era.

This inspection report highlights the need for improved performance measures that indicate achievement of outcomes, meaningful measures of how effective any intervention is and a longer term approach to reporting and oversight. Delivering the draft PfG requires collaboration between stakeholders with multi-agency interventions and this places pressure on the governance arrangements that tend to focus on individual organisations. In this vein a recommendation is made to introduce governance arrangements reflecting multi-agency and pan-departmental working with robust performance measurement and accountability frameworks. Along with this the increased demand on partners to the CJS, such as the Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise (VCSE) sector, should be specifically addressed.



# Recommendations

## Strategic Recommendations

1

Introducing performance score cards (report cards) and an accessible website (similar to *Scotland Performs*) should be a priority to accompany the introduction of Outcome Based Accountability™ (paragraph 1.26).

2

The Department of Justice (DoJ), in conjunction with stakeholders, should develop governance arrangements reflecting multi-agency and pan-departmental working with robust performance measurement and accountability frameworks (paragraph 1.35).

## Operational Recommendations

1

CJS agencies and partners should track and report on the level of resources deployed to the elements of the delivery plans and associated outcomes (paragraph 1.40).

2

Risks should be framed around the impact on service users and developed to cover the partnerships approach (paragraph 1.42).

3

There needs to be an assessment of the impact on the resources of the third sector and other partners of changes to disposals and referrals from primary agencies (paragraph 2.42).




Figure 1

Directorates

Executive Agencies

Executive NDPBs

Other Bodies



# Inspection Report



# Strategy and governance

## The Criminal Justice System

- 1.1 The Criminal Justice System (CJS) is complex and involves many different players that need to work together to be effective. The extent of interplay between the different agencies and the varying degrees of structural and operational independence means there is no single owner of the system (see Figure 1, pg 10). On one hand this provides a framework of checks and balances with separation between the investigatory and prosecutorial decisions and limits political influence on elements such as the judiciary and the police. On the other hand it can create difficulties in co-ordinating delivery, increase costs and confuse accountability and oversight.
- 1.2 Added to the structural complexity of the CJS is the volume of activity that flows through the system (see Figure 2, pg 30). Individual agencies capture data at various points in the process, each striving to measure their workload both to assess how well they are doing and to make plans for the future. One issue that arises from a system with many moving parts is the creation of multiple points of failure – with problems in one agency affecting the performance of other agencies or the system as a whole. When the complexity of criminal behaviour – which is not always fully understood – is added to the differing priorities of the individual agencies, the challenge to managing the overall system becomes apparent.
- 1.3 The work of Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJI) over many years has highlighted how the vulnerabilities of the system may lead to significant failures. These included delays in preparing files, compiling documentation and data, delays in processing defendants, addressing the specific needs of victims, transferring responsibility for individuals between agencies, understanding and reflecting community needs and prioritising resources in the face of reduced funding.
- 1.4 On the positive side there were also examples of successful collaborations between agencies. CJI reported on the work of the justice organisations that participated in the Public Protection Arrangements Northern Ireland<sup>2</sup>. Progress is being made in other areas including the joint working on Child Sexual Exploitation, the Indictable Cases Pilot, the Victims and Witness Care

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2 An Inspection of Public Protection Arrangement Northern Ireland. CJI, June 2011  
<http://cjini.org/getattachment/162399f3-d146-40ae-b9eb-cbd1980645b8/Public-Protection-Arrangements-Northern-Ireland.aspx>

Units and *'The Working Together Project'* to improve file quality and disclosure. The success factors common to these areas were an agreed objective/s, effective communication between the criminal justice agencies, action plans that delivered product, senior managerial oversight, and shared resources. Essentially, mechanisms to combat the inherent separateness of the CJS agencies.

- 1.5 The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) prepares the majority of the published statistics provided by the CJS and NISRA personnel are embedded in a number of the agencies and the Department of Justice (DoJ). The statistical information accords with the national quality standards and, subject to the odd error,<sup>3</sup> are accurate and robust.

## The Programme for Government

- 1.6 The challenges faced by the CJS agencies were complicated further by the recognition that other public bodies, such as health and social services, were vital contributors to delivering the aims of the CJS. Bringing common purpose and pointing the individual elements in the same direction relies on an overarching strategy.
- 1.7 This lies in the shape of the Northern Ireland draft Programme for Government (PfG) 2016-2021 which represents a development of the outcomes based approach to public governance established in the PfG 2011-2015. The increased focus on the major societal outcomes that the Northern Ireland Executive wants to achieve acknowledges the need to establish a basis for all sectors to contribute to the development of plans and actions. The underlying influence for the draft PfG is the outcomes based approach adopted in other jurisdictions with specific reference made to the work of Mark Friedman as set out in his book *'Trying Hard is Not Good Enough'*, which describes a practical technique known as Outcome Based Accountability™ (OBA™)<sup>4</sup> that supports an increased outcomes focus in public policy.
- 1.8 The role of the CJS becomes a cornerstone of the draft PfG with the aim of creating a society that is lawful, just, peaceful and prosperous. An important tenet of the draft PfG is the emphasis on partnership across all of government, its Executive and non-Executive Agencies and the VCSE sector. As a first step in making all of this possible, is the need to have some common drivers that cascade from the draft PfG to the various bodies that make up the CJS.
- 1.9 The DoJ has drawn up a business plan to deliver its commitments under the draft PfG<sup>5</sup>. The DoJ is leading on the delivery of the PfG outcome;

*'We have a safe community where we respect the law and each other.'*

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3 For example, the 2009 prison population stats contained an error that was corrected in 2012.

4 Northern Ireland Executive (2016) *Draft Programme for Government Framework 2016-21* [Online] Available from: <https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/consultations/newnigov/draft-pfg-framework-2016-21.pdf> page 8.

5 Ibid page 12, footnote 2.

1.10 Aligned to this are three PfG measures:

- Reduce crime and the harm and vulnerability caused by crime;
- Reduce re-offending; and
- Increased effectiveness of the justice system.

and five Ministerial Priorities:

- Mental health;
- Young people;
- Older people;
- Domestic violence; and
- Women influencing the justice system.

1.11 The three PfG measures were then distilled into action plans. A similar planning process was instigated by the various CJS agencies with the development of corporate and business plans completing the cascade from the overall draft PfG.

1.12 As a case in point the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) in conjunction with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) developed the Northern Ireland Policing Plan for 2016 by (amongst other things) taking into account the draft PfG, the five long term objectives for policing outlined by the Minister of Justice in 2012 and the Chief Constable's purpose of keeping people safe. This gave rise to the five strategic themes for policing in Northern Ireland.

They were:

- Communication and engagement;
- Protection of people and communities;
- Reduction in offending;
- More efficient and effective delivery of justice; and
- More efficient and effective policing.

1.13 These closely aligned with the Department's PfG measures and in turn, informed the annual policing plan linking the themes to strategic outcomes and specific measures of what the NIPB want the police to do. For example,

Theme	Communication and Engagement
<b>Strategic Outcome</b>	<b>Increasing trust and confidence in policing</b>
<b>Measures</b>	<p><i>Increase the level of public confidence in the police's ability to provide an ordinary day to day service and in the local police.</i></p> <p><i>Where confidence in policing is lower, the PSNI along with the Board, Police and Community Safety Partnerships (PCSPs) and District Commanders will select six areas across NI in which to conduct qualitative research.</i></p> <p><i>Thereafter the PSNI will report to the Board twice yearly on initiatives in these areas to improve confidence.</i></p> <p><i>PSNI with the Board, PCSPs, expert stakeholders and District Commanders will conduct targeted qualitative research where young people's confidence in policing is lower.</i></p> <p><i>Thereafter the PSNI will report to the Board twice yearly on initiatives in these areas to improve confidence.</i></p>

- 1.14 This process was repeated for each of the overarching PSNI themes to complete the annual policing plan giving rise to 12 strategic outcomes, 26 measures and 13 quantitative targets. A performance monitoring framework is in place and will be used to assess progress for each of the outcomes.
- 1.15 The Probation Board for Northern Ireland (PBNI) have a similar planning process with strategic themes outlined in its three year Corporate Plan cycle and thence to objectives in the Business Plan. Looking at the primary objective for the PBNI of reducing re-offending and making communities safer sees a close correlation with the themes of both the PfG and the Northern Ireland Policing Plan. The PBNI's Corporate Plan and Annual Business Plan were similarly aligned to the furtherance of the overall aims of the PfG. Internally, the PBNI then develop a range of actions to achieve these objectives with associated targets and indicators that are used to assess performance.
- 1.16 The other CJS agencies were also aligning their strategic plans with the high level aims of the draft PfG and incorporating performance measures and indicators to assess progress and achievement. As a first step the strategic planning process has identified the outcomes to be achieved and put in place a framework to define the work needed to achieve this.
- 1.17 This report looks at the use of management information and performance management information in a number of CJS agencies reflecting on their recent planning and activity and also looking forward to the OBA™ approach.

## Governance and Outcomes Based Accountability.

- 1.18 As explained to CJI Inspectors, OBA™ involved measuring and evaluating the impact on individuals and the overall population of any given intervention. (A fuller explanation of the model of outcomes based government being used by the Northern Ireland Executive is available<sup>6</sup>). The fundamental concept underpinning an outcomes-based model of government accountability is a shift away from a traditional focus on *inputs* and *outputs* towards a focus on *outcomes*. Performance measures and performance indicators become a means to assess progress and achievement of outcomes rather than being the measure of success. The major challenge being to develop meaningful measures that show how much change has occurred, what was the impact of that change and, most importantly, did the respective agency's interventions give rise to the impact with the challenge of separating that impact from the background activities? Capturing this data is time consuming and can be subjective. But if the change in peoples' lives is not measured, then linking the work of the CJS and those in the system is lost.
- 1.19 Although measuring and accounting for inputs and outputs in the CJS and the rest of the public service were well developed, measuring outcomes was less common. For the most part the CJS was good at measuring its activities but less so at assessing the impact of those activities. Without independent assessment the implicit assumption is that completing the activities equals successful delivery. CJI identified this in the review of PCSPs highlighting the concentration on activities and events without measuring the impact as an area for improvement.<sup>7</sup>
- 1.20 As well as delivering meaningful change, the outcome based approach has other benefits as it lessens any tendency for activities – such as sanctions – to be driven by quotas and for agencies to “game” their statistics. The temptation remains that agencies will continue to measure what they can and try to shoe-horn these measures into the outcome accountability framework. The complex nature of crime, reducing harm, anti-social behaviour, delivering rehabilitation and so on demands a more complex approach than simple task and finish projects. Single agency measures crammed into an annual (and restrictive budgetary cycle) are inadequate and the need to develop additional measures is acknowledged. An explicit intent to develop additional performance measures and commission independent assessment of the impact of the work of the CJS agencies, must be addressed in the action plans of the CJS agencies.
- 1.21 Modifying or replacing the existing performance measures and indicators to measure outcomes not only challenges the statistics to be gathered and the systems to do that, but probably requires a philosophical shift in the interpretation of the data presented to those charged with governance. There are early discussions to develop a more comprehensive CJS management information facility based on Causeway to deliver overarching data and analysis although pressure on resources will be an obstacle to be overcome.

6 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service Briefing paper, pages 54/16 26 August 2016 NIAR 215-15, Michael Potter Outcomes-Based Government: Scrutiny of Outcomes <http://cjini.org/TheInspections/Inspection-Reports/2014/October---December/Police-and-Community-Safety-Partnership>

7 Police and Community Safety Partnerships: A review of governance, delivery and outcomes. CJI, Decemeber 2014 <http://cjini.org/TheInspections/Inspection-Reports/Latest-Publications.aspx?did=1431>

- 1.22 Looking at how CJS agencies measure corporate performance using the analysis of their baseline business plans gives scale to the challenge faced by the CJS bodies. As an example, the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service (NICTS) governance process generates comprehensive amounts of data but despite the effort put into measuring their outputs - never mind outcomes – an assessment of how well they have done still lies open to interpretation of the data. The NICTS Annual Report for 2014-15, reports 62% of delivery objectives on track for achievement during 2014-15 with five out of 45 objectives achieved in Quarter 3. Alongside this, an analysis of courtroom utility shows many operating below 50% and disparity in the running costs of each establishment.
- 1.23 On the other hand, satisfaction surveys show a very high level of positive responses from jurists and other court room users and CJ reported a very high level of accuracy in the recording of court orders. With a reasonably constant level of activity over the last three years against a backdrop of reduced funding, an overall improvement in efficiency is indicated. Counter-intuitively the more targets and indicators in place the more difficult is an assessment of performance or improvement.
- 1.24 Introducing an outcome based approach offers some measure of consistency year on year. Typically three to five years is needed to see a significant change, described as “turning the curve”<sup>8</sup> which defines success as doing better than the current trend or trajectory for a measure. This means changing the direction of the curve or, in some cases, slowing the rate at which things are getting worse.
- 1.25 Measuring success over a longer time frame also means taking a longer term approach to oversight. Short term variances in indicators and targets will not be the measure of performance as they have to be set alongside the analysis of overall trends.
- 1.26 Presenting this information to the oversight and governance bodies is the challenge. The systems presently do not capture all the data needed to measure outcomes and using the available performance measures assumes they actually deliver. Developing dashboards and other presentational arrays is limited by the lack of integration of systems and restrictions on data sharing and inconsistency in unique personal identifiers<sup>9</sup>. The use of performance scorecards to give an overview of performance was developed by the Scottish Government with the introduction of an outcomes focused approach to government. Although not without some issues, the scorecards were regarded as a successful answer to the need for a readily available and transparent means of assessing overall corporate performance.<sup>10</sup> The PSNI have modelled their development of performance report cards on the OBA<sup>TM</sup> approach and these should assist performance reporting and be replicated across the CJS.<sup>11</sup>

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8 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service Briefing Paper Paper41/16, 22 June 2016, NIAR 165-16 p 16 Ral Se 'Outcomes based government' [http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/executive\\_office/4116.pdf](http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/executive_office/4116.pdf) - p7.

9 People moving through the CJS can be referenced in differing ways causing confusion when transfers between agencies and Management Information Systems takes place.

10 Scottish Government (2014), *Scotland Performs Update 2015-16*, Edinburgh: Scottish Government: <http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0046/00460523.pdf>.

11 Adapted from Mark Friedman "Trying Hard is Not Good Enough: How to produce measurable improvements for customers and communities" BookSurge Publishing, May 2009; ISBN 978-1439237861

## Strategic Recommendation 1

**Introducing performance scorecards (report cards) and an accessible website (similar to *Scotland Performs*) should be a priority to accompany the introduction of Outcome Based Accountability™.**

- 1.27 Two other governance issues arise from the outcomes based approach: Firstly, narrowing the gap between the public perception of success and that held by the CJS organisations. The public view of success in the criminal justice field often relies on the material presented to them via the popular media and that inevitably focuses on numeric outputs. The number of people killed in road traffic collisions was a case in point. The low levels in 2012 were welcome but as a measure of PSNI achievement belied the role of other agencies. The police are not alone in this, other CJS agencies, NICTS, Public Prosecution Service (PPS), Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) and the PBNI can also find themselves measured against a backdrop of numbers of convictions, sentencing, reoffending rates with the occasional serious incident leading to calls for further reviews, inspections, more compliance and so on.
- 1.28 Yet the individual agencies do not use these as a measure of success. The PPS who are closest to the prosecution process do not see their role as achieving convictions – rather they provide the best quality prosecution. The NICTS hold no accountability for the sentences imposed but rather measure performance (amongst other things) as the accuracy of recording the decisions.
- 1.29 Providing access to a source of information describing progress in delivering CJS outcomes (and the draft PfG) similar to the ‘*Scotland Performs*’ website should be readily available.
- 1.30 Secondly, the delivery of the outcomes may not lie totally within the scope of the primary agency thus, the NICTS may dedicate resources to providing a problem solving court but the actual interventions and therefore the outcomes, will be delivered by and attributed to a different agency. The PSNI have reported to the NIPB that as much as half their activity was not crime related. The NIPS relies to a great extent on other agencies to deliver outcomes around rehabilitation and reduced re-offending. The Departmental action plans do not go far enough in defining resource allocations for other agencies such as those in the VCSE sector and marrying the demand information with resources needed to meet that demand should be developed.

## Governance and Partnerships

- 1.31 The demands of the draft PfG and the delivery plans needed for collaboration between stakeholders and multi-agency interventions places pressure on the governance arrangements that focus on individual organisations. The DoJ has foreseen some of the issues around accountability in shared enterprises through delivery plans that will be given effect through a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) who reports to those charged with governance on the outcomes of the scheme or intervention irrespective of the departmental boundaries.

Alongside this, the Executive gave a commitment that a Programme for Government Delivery Unit would be established to ensure ongoing monitoring of the Programme for Government 2016-21.<sup>12</sup>

- 1.32 Inspectors, in discussion with management and stakeholders, identified the following governance issues arising from partnership arrangements:
1. Delivery and action plans focus on only one agency raising issues around governance of multi-agency work.
  2. The quality assurance and performance management of the actual interventions falls to line management and personnel removed from the SRO and outwith their governance regime.
  3. Individuals need to be sufficiently informed or engaged to respond to the outcomes approach.
  4. Partnership working (as in PCSPs) suffered from a focus on holding agencies to account for localised activities distracting from true partnership working and problem solving<sup>13</sup>.
  5. Although departmental heads have welcomed the directive to share outcomes and work together, there are issues around data sharing and sharing of resources.
  6. Resources in the context of the CJS are mostly personnel with specific roles and introducing new partnering arrangements brings with it additional demands.
  7. The movement of officials round the system means increased pressure on the institutional memory required to assess performance and learn from past failures.
- 1.33 The establishment of the Programme Delivery Unit with SROs responsible for the action plans is welcomed but it is debateable whether it would have the desired level of transparency. It will provide suitable governance at the project management and operational level, but Inspectors maintain their caveat that at the first sign of negative metrics, the commitment to long term interventions and funding will be tested.
- 1.34 A governance structure that commands a system-wide viewpoint and incorporates Ministerial direction on funding and interventions with respect to outcome based accountability is needed. The Criminal Justice Board and Criminal Justice Delivery Group were established to bring together the criminal justice bodies into a discursive environment without a governance role. The introduction of Enhanced Combination Orders was a successful example of their work but the opportunity to provide the required governance structure remains.

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12 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service Briefing Paper Paper41/16, 22 June 2016, NIAR 165-16 p 16 Ral Se 'Outcomes based government' [http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/executive\\_office/4116.pdf](http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/executive_office/4116.pdf)

13 Police and Community Safety Partnerships: A review of governance delivery and outcomes, CJI, December 2014 <http://cjini.org/TheInspections/Inspection-Reports/Latest-Publications.aspx?did=1431>

- 1.35 To this end, the Criminal Justice Board and the Criminal Justice Delivery Group offer a solution providing the leadership to deliver achievement at the highest level of outcomes, or intervene with partners at agency and Departmental level to align resources and make necessary changes to the delivery plans up to and including PfG level. The reporting lines from the Programme Delivery Unit would allow evaluation of progress to date, evaluation of the effectiveness of the delivery plans and co-ordination of resources and interventions across the CJS and either directly with other Departments and their agencies, or through the Executive Office.

## Strategic Recommendation 2

**The DoJ in conjunction with stakeholders, should develop governance arrangements reflecting multi-agency and pan-departmental working with robust performance measurement and accountability frameworks.**

### Resourcing the Delivery Plans

- 1.36 Building on the previous point around the prioritising of the delivery plans and the associated outcomes, is the absence of any meaningful costing applied to the individual strands. Personnel may be assigned to the various plans but it is not unknown for reprioritisation to occur at short notice due to operational pressures. CJI reported on the impact of reprioritisation of personnel in community policing and also within the Prison Service; if this occurs within individual organisations, the potential for it to occur across departments is much greater. The allocation of a specific amount of resources to the delivery plan objectives would give a sense of the relative priority attached to the plans and provide a baseline for governance oversight. Especially if resources are diverted or not delivered.
- 1.37 Political representatives charged with oversight interviewed by Inspectors accepted that the planning process identified the outcomes to be achieved, but raised the need for a baseline of the resources allocated to the action plans to assess priorities and to measure the actual resources committed. Previous attempts to link resources to Public Service Agreements were described as too high level by the Department of Finance<sup>14</sup> which recommended that;
- “Performance outcomes and the delivery of the Programme for Government should not be directly attributable to allocations in budgets but should be monitored and delivered regardless of budget inputs.”*
- 1.38 Whereas a recent research paper quoted the view that there was potential merit in using performance measurement in the budgeting process.<sup>15</sup> Resolving this impasse would go some way to the development of meaningful performance measures and assist in the future prioritisation of resources.

14 <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/official-report/reports-11-12/13-february-2012>

15 [http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/executive\\_office/5416.pdf&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwjH5779mMTSAhXIWxQKH3sC6oQFggJMAE&client=internal-uds-cse&usq=AFQjCNEVWcBmxlixRmayrLAuYiRmLN3X\\_Q](http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2016-2021/2016/executive_office/5416.pdf&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwjH5779mMTSAhXIWxQKH3sC6oQFggJMAE&client=internal-uds-cse&usq=AFQjCNEVWcBmxlixRmayrLAuYiRmLN3X_Q) Continued development in the Scottish Parliament of linkages between outcomes and budgeting in the scrutiny process are also worth note. It would appear from the experience of the Scottish Parliament that, whilst it is desirable to have the flexibility to scrutinise outcomes independently of the budget process, it is also important not to lose the value of using performance information in the budgeting process.

- 1.39 The demand for partnership working will increase over the next five years and begs the question how different partners will track and report on the level of resources being deployed.
- 1.40 The short term nature of public sector funding using annual budgets with very limited end of year carry-over is a possible source of conflict with an outcomes approach. The VCSE sector often receive notice of their funding late in the year and the conditions of offer do not provide much flexibility. The work to review the funding of the VCSE sector and procurement processes that supports the longer term work of the VCSE sector and encourages partnership working is welcome.

### Operational Recommendation 1

**CJS agencies and partners should track and report on the level of resources deployed to the elements of the delivery plans and associated outcomes.**

### Governance and Management of Risks

- 1.41 Presently each CJS body has its own risk register and one particular focus of this process is to identify a single risk owner - a form of accountability that allows any negative events to be foreseen and mitigated. By its nature the corporate risk registers focused on the risk to an organisation and its objectives. A review of the corporate risks by CJI Inspectors revealed that none of the CJS agencies had corporate risks framed around the impact on service users. This approach is easy to understand and it provided clarity to plans and projects which in turn could be scrutinised by, say, an Audit and Risk Committee. Delivering outcomes requires working across organisations and the internal allocation of risks to a specific owner may not cover all the risks to an outcome as a single organisation may not identify them and they may not be able to give effect to ownership.
- 1.42 A mechanism whereby the overall risks to an outcome during the planning phase rather than to processes or outputs can be evaluated is useful. One such approach is Assumption Based Communication Dynamics (ABCD) where the assumptions associated with the delivery of an outcome are assessed by each stakeholder in turn to evaluate weaknesses in the delivery plan or intervention. This is only one methodology but the inherent advantage over singular risk registers is the assessment of the handover and information exchanges between agencies and systems. It also looks at delivery from a positive assumption of successful delivery rather than a negative risk perspective.

## Operational Recommendation 2

**Risks should be framed around the impact on service users and developed to cover the partnerships approach.**

- 1.43 The silo approach to accountability is another area where the focus on outcomes with all the inherent cross working that is needed, may create difficulties within the current paradigm of accountability.
- 1.44 Public Sector funding likes to attribute each pound to a particular spend, audit trails are valued and economy and efficiency are the most developed aspects of the value for money culture. Effectiveness, the third element of the value for money concept is less acknowledged and the common mechanisms of reporting performance using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), Key Performance Measures, unit costing, Annual Report and Accounts, highlight reporting, post project evaluations and so on lean towards numeric measures and hard targets. Outcomes are not so easily crammed into the management accounting tin. The involvement of Local Government and the Third Sector in the outcome based accountability regime is essential, but the co-ordination of resources and development of performance frameworks through community planning, is still at an early stage.



# Delivery

## Monitoring and reporting on resources and outputs

- 2.1 The CJS agencies reviewed by Inspectors<sup>16</sup> had robust arrangements in place to monitor resources enabling them to meet the budgetary requirements in 2015-16 including in-year reductions to budgets. For example, the NICTS faced a 19.5% (£8.1m) reduction in funding and an 11.7% reduction in staffing levels whilst maintaining the same level of service as in previous years. The PPS managed a 14% reduction in staffing whilst maintaining similar levels of service.
- 2.2 The CJS agencies had effective mechanisms in place to monitor and report performance against the range of outputs recorded in their business plans. There was evidence that the cost of infrastructure was available to inform decision-making although there was less incentive for organisations to reduce these costs until reductions in funding demanded cost cutting measures. The rationalisation of the PPS and the NICTS estates are a case in point.
- 2.3 A key feature in all of the agencies' planning was the acceptance that further cuts to resources would take place. A variety of efforts were being made to reduce the impact on front line services as illustrated by the PSNI adopting Priority-Based Resourcing (PBR). Its aim is to systematically assess the contribution of existing services and allocate resources to those with the highest priority. As reported by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) the aims of PBR are laudable but there is a need to gather representative and detailed data to inform the assessment phase of PBR.<sup>17</sup>

## Monitoring and reporting achievement and performance

- 2.4 Discussions with the senior levels of management across the CJS agencies confirmed Inspectors' views that the linkage between the high level objectives, sometimes described as outcomes, and the planning process was clear. Some senior management expressed the view that although there was regular reporting with extensive statistical and numerical data, progress on the impact of strategic objectives was less obvious. Balancing this was the view of other senior Executives that the reported data was comprehensive and gave them a good oversight of performance.

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16 Inspectors reviewed NIPS, PSNI, PBNI, LSA, PPS, DoJ and the documentation of a number of Third Sector bodies documentation and met with officials.

17 PEEL: Police Efficiency - Police Service of Northern Ireland, HMIC, August 2016  
<http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publications/peel-police-efficiency-police-service-of-northern-ireland/>

- 2.5 Inspectors were of the view that the reports to senior management tended towards more detail than could be usefully assessed at the various review meetings that were held. Looking at a selection of the papers presented to and the minutes of Board meetings, Audit and Risk Committee meetings, finance meetings and strategic planning meetings (or their equivalents) the reports included very detailed data on activities with extensive data on targets, percentages of outputs and an assessment of achievement using traffic light (red, amber, green) graphics or narrative.
- 2.6 The non-Executives interviewed by CJI expressed satisfaction with the quality and relevance of the management information presented to them with the caveat that an outcome based approach would require development of additional measures. The structures for risk management were robust, with regular meetings, reviews of risk registers and independent membership with requisite skills.
- 2.7 Whilst the information provided to Boards tended towards too much detail, there was a clear separation between the day to day management of operations and the strategic elements of workforce planning and budgeting.
- 2.8 The view was expressed by Executives and non-Executives that the presentation of performance data could be developed, thus:
- more performance focused with less operational numbers;
  - more visual and less tabular;
  - more trend analysis and less absolutes;
  - more comparative and less insular; and
  - improved use of narrative to support the figures.
- 2.9 Senior and non-Executives expressed the view that management information presented to them was comprehensive. While agreeing with this assessment it was evident to Inspectors that evaluation of organisational performance was based as much on Executives' sectoral knowledge as on data provided to them. When asked to quantify how much more successful an organisation was this year compared to previous years, Senior Executives and non-Executives confirmed an element of interpretation was required. The use of specific targets that could change year on year was quoted as a barrier to making accurate comparatives. The one caveat to this being the reasonable assessment that the reduction in resources increased productivity as activity levels were at least the same year on year.
- 2.10 The fact that so much data was captured to support the achievement of targets with much of it at the operational level, raised the question how much of the data that is captured was needed and how much does it tell us about our achievement of overall outcomes.

- 2.11 The realigning of indicators and performance measures to outcomes will strengthen the reporting on outcomes across the CJS and **the opportunity should be taken to re-assess the necessity of the data that is being recorded and whether it represents the best use of staff time.**

## Operational management

- 2.12 The nature and content of the performance and management data presented to operational managers within the individual agencies reflected similarities in both delivery and usage. PSNI District Commanders received regular reports showing the statistics for various crime types in their district and comparatives with other districts. A NIPS Governor arriving at work received a comprehensive situation report covering staff sick absences, incident reports, number of prisoners in and out, and other detailed information. Often these managers used this data to respond to immediate needs such as resource allocation, risk assessment and operational planning. Senior operational managers in the NICTS, the PPS and PBNI similarly received regular information on the ongoing activities although the difference in the nature of their work meant that the immediacy and scale of the reallocation of resources or changes to risk analysis and working patterns was less obvious.
- 2.13 All of the managers met by CJI used the information to assess team and also individual performance supported by other performance evaluation processes. The information provided was sufficient to meet managers' needs although direct comparison of performance between areas or regions was tempered by local knowledge and not useful as a stand-alone performance measure.
- 2.14 Senior Operational Managers were clear about the linkage to the strategic objectives/outcomes of their work in the planning process but the routine management information reports that focused on activities and quantitative metrics required interpretation to meet this aim.
- 2.15 Even in some areas where there was a clear link to an overall outcome - such as the reducing offending partnerships - the PSNI Divisional Commanders understandably saw the improved clearance rates as their success factors with the reduction in offending being a success for another day and probably falling to other partners.
- 2.16 The outcome of an increased focus on capturing and using operational metrics as a performance measure was the potential loss of data describing the quality of service delivery. In most instances only the immediate line manager could give an adequate assessment of the quality of intervention with a service user. Inspectors were told that data capture and subsequent validation of data within the NIPS and the PSNI hampered the work of line supervisors.

- 2.17 Frontline police officers stated that they recorded details of their engagements with the community but were unaware of the use to which this data was put. The recording of engagements and incidents was extensive and some officers said that their notes were as much aimed at possible oversight issues in the event of adverse incident reports as they were at management information. The NIPS line management staff entered extensive records onto the PRISM (IT) system. In some instances servicing the system conflicted with their other duties.
- 2.18 Smaller agencies within the CJS were at an advantage to the PSNI as the spans of control were narrower with flatter management structures. This made a difference as the qualitative elements of the management information presented to managers and directors was more easily interrogated and interpreted and operational personnel had closer links to strategic aims and objectives. Thus the scale of the PBNI facilitated regular face to face meetings between the operational and managerial resources. The dissemination of business plans and corporate objectives was aided by the ability of staff to directly contribute to the planning process and the relative uniformity of their core operations in comparison to the PSNI or the NIPS.
- 2.19 This high level of interaction within the PBNI gave a number of advantages:
- less chance of misinterpretation of strategic direction;
  - greater availability of qualitative information that gave insight into the numbers; and
  - linking outcomes to the activities of operations was easier to do and easier to explain.
- 2.20 The PSNI attempt to replicate these advantages through local teams and district management structures that offer a level of planning and resourcing autonomy. Inevitably, there is a limit to the levels of management and operational resources that can be delegated. Crime-related work of the PSNI accounts for less than half of its work activity placing pressure on the planning process and the allocation of resources.

## **Using management information in operations and demand management**

- 2.21 Local managers played a key role in the use of management information and performance management of individuals and delivery of services throughout the CJS. The PSNI receives 500,000 calls for service each year, which it manages through three contact management centres. District Commanders use this and crime data from statistics branch in daily management meetings at district, area and service levels to focus resources on those incidents which present the greatest threat, harm and risk to communities. This includes the policing response to tensions between communities, serious disorder and to provide security for officers conducting routine enquiries who are at risk from paramilitarism. Demands such as these can arise without warning and the operational and community reassurance requirements are resource intensive.

- 2.22 The majority of data was presented on spreadsheets broken down by District Electoral Area (DEA) and crime type. The daily reports to policing districts supported reactive measures such as increasing patrols in an area, targeting a stretch of road or more house calls, but determining the underlying patterns behind spikes in types of incidents was not as readily available as Commanders wished. In one area the application of local knowledge to the raw data gave the best results. As an example, a simple increase in shoplifting with the correct analysis identified that a co-ordinated group was behind the offences.
- 2.23 District Commanders were aware of the move to increase frontline resources that, inevitably, had an impact on the support services but saw merit in allocation of analysts – at least in part – to a district’s requirements. Analysts were previously part of the local team and involved in the daily meetings where they could provide insight that assisted more proactive rather than simply reactive responses to spikes and trends in the incident data being received. Allocation to a district does not necessarily mean co-location as remote linking is readily available.
- 2.24 The independent inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) in Northern Ireland identified a consistent theme indicating a patchy approach to the collection and analysis of information and intelligence. This included the proactive and strategic analysis surrounding the risks and perpetrators of CSE. Delays in forensic exhibits, such as indecent images of children, and gathering of digital evidence was quoted as an issue. The inquiry recommended, *“the PSNI should conduct a review of resources and operational delivery in respect of digital evidence examination to ensure that any evidence of CSE is provided to investigators in a timely manner, and to avoid delay in the courts.”* CJI would reiterate this recommendation.
- 2.25 A recent Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) report stated that the PSNI has a good understanding of the demands on its current resources<sup>18</sup>. On the whole, the PSNI’s current operating model matches resources to demand. The service uses a tiered approach to assess demand and ensure its resources are deployed flexibly to meet demand taking into account organisational priorities.
- 2.26 The PSNI analysed what policing activity consists of in a representative 24-hour period across the whole of the PSNI and in a seven-day period for each District, the operational support department and crime operations department. The information gathered goes beyond the volume and pattern of calls for service and includes information on the time spent on internal processes such as transcribing audio tapes of interviews.
- 2.27 The PSNI used this work to understand demand to restructure its call management department and to determine the number and location of police officers and police staff in its new 11-district local policing model. The 11 policing districts are grouped into three Area Commands (North, South and Belfast). Within these Districts, 34 neighbourhoods were allocated dedicated policing teams.

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18 Ibid

- 2.28 The PSNI undertook a major exercise to align data from the previous area structure to the new area structure maintaining its ability to track and analyse trends. Each of the Area Commands has a Central Tasking Centre (CTC) that uses data from call management and operational activities to shift resources between Districts and areas to respond to peaks in demand and resource intensive operations.
- 2.29 The PSNI Corporate Plan 2016-20 outlines how the PSNI intends to better understand demands from the public, activities it carries out with partners to prevent harm, and demands generated by internal systems, policies and practice. In the CJI report *'Finding the Balance'*, Inspectors recommended that the PSNI improve its workforce planning so that existing performance levels could be sustained and improved to help the PSNI increase the resources available to meet the service's priority to keep people safe.<sup>19</sup>
- 2.30 In the NIPS a prison Governor's daily report – not unlike a police District Commanders – provided a snapshot of activity indicators useful for resource allocation and immediate reaction. These included, reported incidents, complaints, adjudications, a range of KPIs and staff absences.
- 2.31 A key element of the Governors' role was to filter this data and identify any action that needed to be taken. For example, the number of complaints was not necessarily a significant driver; rather the clustering of complaints was the informative aspect. A total of 10 complaints may not indicate a significant issue. However, if they all emanate from different complainants in one house they may.
- 2.32 The NIPS data was analysed across equality and diversity criteria giving the Governor oversight around the treatment of religious and ethnic groups. The number of officers absent from duty had a major impact on the Governor's resource deployment and ultimately on the prison's regime.
- 2.33 At the management level the nature of outcomes to be achieved was known but at operational level performance was driven by different priorities and thus different measures. Unless directly involved in the delivery of programmes contributing to the higher level outcomes (such as reducing re-offending) the reporting system did not provide a regular update on achievement against outcomes.
- 2.34 Below the management level operational officers had a different set of priorities. An officer was more likely to regard success as 45 prisoners present at the start and end of the shift with meals provided, visits and education completed, court appearances arranged and all concluded without incident.
- 2.35 The PBNi and the PPS managed workload using case management systems, adherence to professional standards and codes of practice. Frequent reviews and the team structures in both

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19 Finding the Balance: matching human resources with priorities in the Police Service of Northern Ireland, CJI, May 2013  
<http://www.cjini.org/TheInspections/Inspection-Reports/Latest-Publications.aspx?did=1012>

organisations lent themselves to close working arrangements between managers and staff. Both agencies used quantitative measures of workload to assess demand and to allocate and reallocate resources. Reduced budgets led to divestment of infrastructure to lessen the impact on pay related funding.

- 2.36 In the NICTS, teams assigned to each court provided a high degree of administrative oversight to meet targets and manage court processes. An executive team developed policies and strategies to manage longer term changes in patterns of demand. Staff were assigned to a court but there was sufficient flexibility in the system to meet short-term changes in demand. A significant amount of usage data was collected by the NICTS providing accurate insight into the workloads across the courts estate. This data, in conjunction with budgetary pressures informed decisions around the maintenance and operation of the courts estate.
- 2.37 The NICTS routinely collected data on trial outcomes including cracked and ineffective trials with the cause for the outcome attributed to the defence, prosecution or court. This data could indicate issues around the management of the cases and the NICTS developed a methodology to analyse data on pleas, findings and adjournments recorded in ICOS (the NICTS' IT System). This data has been shared with the PPS since 2013 and the NICTS reported that following consultation, users of the data said that they were satisfied with the methodology and the statistics themselves. The NICTS pointed out that the data was as accurate as a secondary analysis of ICOS allowed whereas in England and Wales, the data on cracked and ineffective trials were arrived at following a meeting of prosecution, defence judiciary and court clerks. Due to the level of resources required, the NICTS had opted in favour of capturing the data from ICOS. Recognising that the NICTS are doing the best they can with the available resources there is always the concern that the attribution of the trial outcome might fall to the path of least resistance.

## Demand management

- 2.38 Demand management within the individual agencies focused primarily on the incoming workload with less attention to the impact on other agencies further down the chain.
- 2.39 Figure 2 (see pg 30) provides some insight into the levels of demand placed on the various criminal justice bodies with the caveat that they are a snapshot in time and require some interpretation. Recorded crime in 2014-15 was 105,000 incidents<sup>20</sup>. The Northern Ireland Crime Survey which is a continuous survey of a sample of 2,074 adults living in private households in Northern Ireland detected crime levels circa 30% higher than the recorded crime figures in 2014-15<sup>21</sup>. The crime survey and recorded crime figures also provide a basis for comparison with England and Wales.<sup>22</sup>

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
20 PSNI database.

21 The difference arises when households do not report the crime where they believe it was too trivial, police would not respond or the matter was resolved.

22 The Crime Survey of England Wales reveals a much greater disparity between recorded crime and the level of crime. circa 3, 500,000 recorded crimes vs circa 8,500,00 in the survey. The Crime Survey estimated that 8.8% (13/14 10%) of adult occupants in Northern Ireland households were victims of at least one crime in the previous year. The equivalent figure in England and Wales is 15.9%. Using the rate of crimes per 1,000 of population allows comparison between areas. In the 12 months to 31 March 2015 Northern Ireland had victim based crime rate of 50.5 per 1,000 of population; a decrease of 9% over the previous five years. During the same period England and Wales had a victim based crime rate of 55.2; a decrease of 15% over the previous five years.

2.40 As Figure 2 illustrates the output of one CJS agency has a major impact on the demand of other agencies within the CJS. Following investigation, the PSNI will forward around 50,000 files annually to the PPS of which approximately 31,000 are presented to court and another 6,000 or so are managed as out of court disposals (out of court disposals and PNDs). Eighty-five percent of defendants at court were convicted; over half (54%) dealt with by way of financial penalties; 3,013 were custodial sentences; 3,733 were suspended sentences and 3,174 were community sentences. The PBNI supervised 4,200 offenders both in prison (21%) and in the community. The Parole Commissioners dealt with 641 referrals and 198 recall requests. The VCSE sector provided a wide range of services throughout the CJS and both its supply and demand were influenced by the levels of activity of the other CJS agencies, the funding they provided and competitive procurement processes.

**Figure 2**



2.41 The increase in partnership arrangements such as Reducing Offending in Partnership and problem-solving courts gives a new dimension to demand management with a primary agency supplying demand to another body. Thus a problem-solving court will direct offenders to other agencies to deliver remedies – perhaps outside the CJS. The NICTS will not deliver these remedies but facilitating the correct one and providing the pathway to that will be their contribution. There is no evidence of assessment of demand on third parties in the resource plans of the primary agencies.

2.42 The concern is that the budgetary management for the delivery of third party work is removed from the demand creating centre. There are pilot programmes in place but historically, most pilots are successful as there is specific resource in place but following roll-out, this may not be the case.

## Operational Recommendation 3

**There needs to be an assessment of the impact on the resources of the third sector and other partners of changes to disposals and referrals from primary agencies.**

### Criminal Justice System or Sector?

- 2.43 The diagrammatic presentation of the CJS in Figure 2 with the disposals from one agency leading to action or reaction by another agency gives the impression of a supply chain with the seamless transfer of people from one end to the other with various engagements and disposals happening along the way.
- 2.44 This analogy does not suffer close scrutiny as a real supply chain uses various controls, including cost, timeliness and quality standards with the options to reject, return or use alternative providers at most stages of the chain if tolerances remain unmet. In the CJS, once a person enters the system they will travel through it no matter the demands they place upon the services or infrastructure of the various CJS agencies.
- 2.45 In an effort to improve efficiency in the system targets have been introduced. In some instances this can be counter productive. Thus within an overall target to complete a case within a timeline the PPS, the NICTS and the PSNI will have specific targets. If each agency used its full allocation it would not be possible to meet the overall target. The impact is that one or other agency becomes pressurised with a sub optimal result. As an example the quality of the PSNI files to the PPS was the subject of review and one issue was the pressure on the PSNI to meet a deadline to forward a file to the PPS. In some cases the files were forwarded although they were incomplete.
- 2.46 In similar fashion, the individualistic approach to risk management in the CJS focusing as it does on mitigating risks to the individual organisation and, in many instances, transferring risks to another agency restricts a system-wide approach to achieving outcomes.
- 2.47 This happened when police presented at hospitals with at risk individuals. The hospitals could not manage the security risks associated with the individuals so it remained with police – even though they were not able to mitigate the health risk posed to the individual.
- 2.48 In some instances the transfer of risk and its subsequent poor management can lead to very severe consequences. One offender with mental health issues remanded into custody by the courts presented a significant challenge to the prison authorities. The inadequate risk assessment at prison reception, in part due to the volume of forms presented to NIPS reception, but also due, in one instance, to NIPS staff overlooking the information on the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (PACE) forms and relying on their own assessment (in the event wrongly), compounded a difficult case. The subsequent focus of the risk management process on security protocols within custody rather than on prisoner well-being directly contributed to the infliction of severe injuries.

- 2.49 More controls, more training, more reminders of procedure will be recommended but the challenge of linking outcomes that are apparent at the strategic level to those working at the coal face remains.
- 2.50 In the supply chain analogy governance is supported when it is housed under one corporate banner or enshrined in legally enforceable contracts but this is not and never will be a public sector dispensation. Thus, the potential for dysfunctional transfer at the agency interfaces remains as a major source of inefficiency with risk to the delivery of outcomes and the whole basis of OBA.
- 2.51 There was evidence of successful multi-agency working in the management of high risk offenders in the community: PBNi engagement with PCSPs; the joint working of the PSNI and PPS to improve file quality; the indictable cases pilot; and the engagement of VCSE providers, such as NIACRO, in direct service delivery.
- 2.52 Co-operation is a key aspect of these arrangements but the risk management, accountability, demand management and funding models operate separately. These models deliver limited success but are subject to failure where unforeseen demand or the prisoner with severe mental health issues exposes the system's weaknesses. Or in less tragic circumstances, a series of poor performance indicators or reprioritising resources leads to short-term changes in one agency that have an adverse impact over the whole process and ultimately the outcomes.
- 2.53 In some cases legislation has been enacted to harness the efforts of various agencies and resources. For example, the Safeguarding Board Order and the Children's Services Co-operation Act placed a statutory duty on partners to deliver outcomes to children as part of the Northern Ireland Executive's Strategy for Children and Young people. Using this approach for every delivery plan supporting the draft Programme for Government is neither a practical option nor a desirable one.

### Quality Assurance Information

- 2.54 One area where the daily workload can be seen to impact on the outcomes is the values and culture that influences the interface and interaction with those in contact with the CJS, be they victim, witness, offender, prisoner, defendant or plaintiff. Returning to the prisoner who suffered harm, the emphasis on balancing decency with security could have given a different outcome.
- 2.55 This instance highlights a more general principle. The systems can provide data, they can give a measure of performance but they cannot provide any real measure of quality of service. Certainly complaints show poor quality service but that is only when they are received, what about those who choose to say nothing or who find obtaining easy access to the system a problem?
- 2.56 Across all the agencies the line manager was the bulwark for quality. Dip sampling files to assess procedure, process and progress was essential. Overseeing proceedings, sitting in on interviews, accompanying work in the field, attending scenes and events gave a much greater sense of quality of delivery than the bare statistics.

- 2.57 The review of performance in the PSNI was comprehensive. Areas within a policing district held performance meetings which fed into the district performance meetings. District Commanders held weekly meetings with the Performance Quality Assurance team using data from various systems drawing on data across crime types, teams, sections and some individual officers. Decisions were reviewed to inform lessons learned. Using the NICHE<sup>23</sup> record management system it was possible to monitor progress of a case and there were various flags that brought non-compliance to the attention of supervisory grades.
- 2.58 Elements of quality assurance were built into the reviews and District Commanders were aware of complaints such as failure to investigate or incivility. Complaints were investigated and recorded giving some measure of ethics and integrity. Audit and compliance teams dip sampled performance information and annual performance reviews of officers were complemented with monthly monitoring. District Commanders reviewed safe operating levels and compared outcome rates across the districts.
- 2.59 The PBNI had a comprehensive and robust approach to quality assurance. They utilised performance reviews, assessed adherence to professional standards, held regular performance meetings and operated a formal quality assurance scheme. In addition, the PBNI implemented a strategic approach to Service User engagement with an offender survey and research to inform and develop probation practice.
- 2.60 The NIPS had robust policies and procedures in place but failings highlighted in Prisoner Ombudsman, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (in England and Wales) (HMIP) and CJJ reports show that the weaknesses in the system arise from individuals not following correct protocols and management not adequately foreseeing risk areas. There are recommendations in these reports to improve performance that if implemented should address these failings.
- 2.61 Since 2014 the PPS implemented changes to its performance management and quality assurance framework including the introduction of quarterly performance and accountability meetings supported by more rigorous reporting and accountability mechanisms. Much of this was modelled on best practice in the Crown Prosecution Service. Following the Starmer Review,<sup>24</sup> the PPS has been implementing a range of recommendations, the most of which went to the heart of quality assurance and delivery of service. This was the subject of a CJJ follow-up review in 2016, to be published later in 2017.
- 2.62 The Legal Services Agency (LSA) had a robust policy and procedure for assessing legal aid applications underpinned by regular performance reviews and an appeal process. The implementation of a new management information system should improve the efficiency of the agency.

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23 Computerised record management system used by the PSNI.

24 The Independent Review of the Prosecution of Related sexual abuse and terrorism cases (the Starmer Review) was carried out by Sir Keir Starmer KCB.QC and Katherine O'Byrne at the request of Barra McGrory QC. It was published in May 2015.



# Outcomes

## Corporate Performance

- 3.1 Corporate performance was measured by reviewing the 2015-16 Business and Corporate Plans and the associated Annual Reports of a number of CJS organisations. The format of the plans was consistent with a number of corporate objectives and associated performance indicators, targets supplemented, in most cases, with activities and tasks to be completed in the relevant period. The organisation's Annual Report then followed the structure of the plans, presented data on the objectives and targets and concluded success or otherwise usually based upon meeting targets or the achievement of particular tasks.
- 3.2 In compiling an overview of the performance of the individual CJS organisations, Inspectors reviewed the Annual Reports of the various bodies as this was the most readily available strategic level document which was most available to the public. The format of the annual reporting was relatively consistent with an assessment of performance supported with numerical and narrative information.
- 3.3 For the most part the quantitative performance data was a tabular presentation of numerical targets with achievement usually expressed as a percentage. Making an assessment of the performance of a specific CJS agency in any particular year created an element of subjectivity dependent on the terms of reference that the assessor set. If it was a measure of improvement in the processing of the various individuals in the system, timeliness in the delivery of papers and decisions, levels of incidents recorded, numbers of courses, programmes, events or interventions accessed or progress against project timelines, there was a wealth of data to analyse.
- 3.4 The challenge to define how much performance had improved year on year or making valid comparisons with other jurisdictions remained. Although the previous year's figures were provided in parenthesis as a measure of year on year improvement this was deficient in two ways. Firstly, the targets changed year to year and, secondly, there was no reliable overall measure of the impact of the work of the various agencies.

- 3.5 The narrative supporting the numerical analysis – usually in the form of a statement from the most Senior Executive – provided some clues as to how the organisation had performed. The most recent reports cited the reduced funding and increased workload as signs of improved productivity and all went further to describe significant change programmes pointing to further improvement in performance to come.
- 3.6 Some examples, presented below, provide a basis to explore the various performance reporting mechanisms in play – with the strong caveat that selection of any particular example is not of itself a negative assessment.

## **PPS**

- 3.7 In its Annual Report of 2015-16, the PPS expressed performance as achievement of a range of key delivery targets brigaded under a range of key performance indicators. Achievement was presented as a percentage outturn alongside the relevant target with the previous year's figures in parenthesis. Even looking at the small sample of targets on page 36 extracted from the 2015-16 PPS Annual Report could lead to differing assessments of performance.
- 3.8 At the simplest level five of the seven targets selected were achieved, reflecting an achievement of over 70% indicating a good level of performance. On a more challenging note considering the previous year's performance, one could argue that some of the targets were not testing enough. Going further, four of the five achieved targets had performance that was less than the previous year. This could indicate that the PPS had not performed as well as the previous year, although these figures do not give any insight into the operating environment faced by the PPS.

<i>Review of Charges</i>	<i>Target / Outcome</i>
Percentage of 28 day charge cases where charge sheets are reviewed within 3 working days of first appearance at court.	<i>Target: 90%</i> <i>Outturn: 86% (89%)</i>
<i>Prosecutorial Decisions - Timeliness</i>	
<i>Percentage of:</i>	
<i>Indictable prosecution decisions issued within</i>	
(i) 100 days	<i>Target: 50%</i> <i>Outturn: 56.9% (62.3%)</i>
(ii) 180 days	<i>Target: 80%</i> <i>Outturn: 79.5% (82.8%)</i>
<i>Summary prosecution decisions issued within</i>	
(i) 15 days	<i>Target: 65%</i> <i>Outturn: 73.0% (73.9%)</i>
(ii) 40 days	<i>Target: 80%</i> <i>Outturn: 85.0% (87.2%)</i>
<i>Diversory decisions issued within</i>	
(i) 15 days	<i>Target: 65%</i> <i>Outturn: 78.7% (76.8%)</i>
(ii) 30 days	<i>Target: 80%</i> <i>Outturn: 86.3% (86.9%)</i>

- 3.9 Introducing the narrative of the Annual Report the breadth and scale of change within the service becomes more apparent. The highlighted example indicated significant changes to the structure of the PPS with associated financial savings. The level of confidence in the PPS had risen in the last two years to 74%. Another aspect of the performance of the PPS that was not in doubt was the response to reduced funding and the subsequent loss of 14% of their personnel. From this perspective the productivity of the PPS has improved significantly year on year. The Performance Analysis section of the PPS Annual Report goes further than the absolute figures and attempts to account for changes in performance across the different areas of PPS work using the key performance indicators. Even with this comprehensive analysis of performance indicators and achievement against targets, assessing the overall impact of the PPS on the CJS or the delivery of access to justice, was more difficult.

The consequence of a combination of changes in demand with reductions in funding across the Public Service is well demonstrated by the PPS Transformation Programme.

Changes in the numbers of files presented to the PPS (-18% from 2011 to 2015), reductions in funding and an analysis of the outcomes in serious crimes led to significant structural and staffing changes within PPS.

Where there were previously four regions and six regional offices there are now two regions and four regional offices. The amalgamation of the regions saw the closure of two offices and a loss of almost 80 staff reducing the staffing and infrastructure costs to the PPS.

A Serious Crime Unit (SCU) was established to deal with a range of the most serious offences including murder, manslaughter, rape and serious sexual offences, human trafficking, prostitution and related offences. Previously, cases of this type would typically have been dealt with by the regions and the SCU centralises those staff with the experience to deal with the most serious cases. This was aimed at lessening the impact of losing experienced staff across all of the regional offices.

## Legal Services Agency (LSA)

- 3.10 The Legal Services Agency (LSA) Annual Report included a performance summary that described the challenges faced by the restructuring of the Legal Services Commission into the LSA. This included analysis of the adoption of policies and shared services from the parent department and concluding these were successfully achieved. The other main challenge arose in the payment of legal aid claims. For many years the annual overspend of the budget was inevitable as the demand for funding consistently exceeded the allocated resources – and exceeded them by a consistent amount. In 2015-16 the withdrawal of services by barristers and some solicitors reduced the number of bills from the Crown Court. In turn, the LSA redirected its resources to maximise the funds which it could expend. As a result the LSA was able to bring down the processing times in many areas and make payments within a number of days of the bills being submitted. A definite performance improvement but more incidental than premeditated.
- 3.11 In previous years the strictures of the funding landscape and the forecasting mechanisms available relegated the performance management information to a purely reactive role. As explained to Inspectors, if the full payments capacity of the agency was exploited, the available funds would in all likelihood be exhausted sometime before the year end. The possibility would then arise that some claimants might have their payments deferred simply due to the timing of their claims. In an effort to match demand and funding profiles, the LSA would rein back the payments processing to ensure that funds were available – albeit at a reduced rate until the end of the year.

- 3.12 Looking at the history of the legal aid system there has been much emphasis on structural reform to the actual payments body, from a division of the NICTS to a Commission and now to an Executive Agency. Internally, much effort was dedicated to assessing liabilities to improve the accuracy of the balance sheet and a complex mechanism developed to forecast potential claims on the fund. The preponderance of paper based systems and timing delays with claims from previous years impacting on current budgets required interpretation to provide useful management information. The LSA has embarked upon a modernisation project that will bring claims on line – allowing accurate valuation of outstanding claims. This coupled with the reforms to balance demand and available funding are primary elements in the drive to improve performance of the LSA.

## PBNI

- 3.13 The annual performance report for the PBNI in 2015-16 reported on the 10 objectives for the business year. The objectives were brigaded under five strategy themes drawn from the Corporate Plan. The conclusion was that eight of the 10 were fully achieved and the remainder partially achieved. (Within this, 44 of 46 actions were completed (96%)). The evidence was provided that the PBNI was delivering services and projects that directly contributed to their main outcomes of making communities safer and reducing reoffending. Their survey work showed levels of user satisfaction and workload was maintained or increased with reduced funding indicating increased productivity. The overall picture is one of positive delivery.
- 3.14 Even with these positive indicators of performance, the actual measure of outcomes in the Annual Report is an internal assessment of achievement with green status awarded to reflect success. Quantifying the level of achievement of the strategic outcomes of the PBNI relies on the narrative. In line with other CJS agencies, the PBNI identifies replacement of its case management system to provide the level of management information required and the introduction of OBA™ can only emphasise this need.

## PSNI

- 3.15 Performance management in the PSNI is a complex arena. There was a wealth of management information with performance indicators, independent inspection and assessment, surveys and layers of internal and external oversight. As discussed earlier (par 2.12) operational data was regular and readily available. The Causeway system provided an effective conduit for the transfer of police files to the PPS and onward to other CJS agencies. One criticism of the plethora of indicators presented as a measure of corporate performance raised with Inspectors was that changes in the indicators do not necessarily mean achievement. In one report a head count of the positive and negative PSNI performance indicators in its Annual Report concluded that the PSNI performance was less than 50% successful<sup>25</sup>. The most recent HMIC review of the PSNI (albeit focusing on two particular areas of service delivery) found the force to be efficient but not particularly effective.<sup>26</sup>

25 Continuous improvement arrangements in policing Northern Ireland Audit Office, March 2016. [https://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/sites/niao/files/media-files/continuous\\_improvement\\_2016.pdf](https://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/sites/niao/files/media-files/continuous_improvement_2016.pdf)

26 Ibid, p23 footnote 17.

- 3.16 Whereas, the 2014-15 Northern Ireland Crime Survey (NICS) estimated that only 8.8% of all households and their adult occupants were victims of at least one NICS crime during the 12 months prior to interview (2013-14 figure 10.0%). This represents the lowest NICS victimisation (prevalence) rate since the measure was first reported in NICS 1998 (23.0%).
- 3.17 Combined with a reduction in recorded crime and an increase in confidence in policing over the last five years, one can be forgiven for thinking that police performance may have improved. Contributing to the interpretative difficulties, the NIPB recorded 15 out of 16 targets fully achieved against its objective of delivering an effective and efficient PSNI. The constants in this sea of performance measures were the higher level measures such as confidence in policing, levels of recorded crime, numbers of complaints against the police, and all of these had improved.
- 3.18 Even single indicators are open to interpretation. The PSNI set the following targets for Hate Crime and Road Safety in the period April to September 2016.


Hate Crime Targets	Results
Increase the outcome rate for crimes with a racist motivation by 2%	(result decrease of 1.6%)
Increase the outcome rate for crimes with a homophobic motivation by 2%	(result decrease of 3.2%)
Increase the outcome rate for crimes with a sectarian motivation by 2%	(result decrease of 0.6%)
Increase of 10% in the number of drivers detected for	
Drink/Drug Driving offences	(result decrease 24%)
Speeding offences	(result decrease 31%)
Mobile phone offences	(result decrease 19%)
Seatbelt offences	(result decrease 32%)

- 3.19 Two things come out of this. Firstly, the results suggest that the PSNI failed in every instance, although there is evidence to the contrary. Secondly, an analysis of what an outcome was in the PSNI parlance revealed it was more accurately described as an output.

## NIPS

- 3.20 In similar, but contrary vein, measures of performance at corporate level in the Annual Report and in individual performance reviews in the NIPS were positive whereas reports from HMIP, CJI, the Prison Review Team and the Prisoner Ombudsman were emphatically negative. A strong sign that the various entities were not only measuring different things, but their view of what should be measured and how things could or should be run also differed.
- 3.21 Senior Management in the NIPS received corporate information in the standard tabular format with performance against targets and KPIs. Their challenge, as they explained to Inspectors, was aligning the operational environment faced by officers to the corporate outcomes. The capture of management information was focused on gathering measures of activities and outputs but it was more difficult to translate this into higher level assessment. Some idea of how the resources of the organisation were prioritised to deliver outcomes such as rehabilitation and reduced offending alongside security and administration was seen as basic data that should be reported on.

### Breakdown of resource deployment in the NIPS (illustration)



- 3.22 It is difficult to measure a successful outcome through a series of indicators only, especially when those indicators have been developed in a previous era and most probably to measure outputs and achievement of targets. The DoJ is undertaking a programme of work to develop performance measures showing the progress in achieving outcomes and this will strengthen performance management and support outcome based accountability.

## Interventions

- 3.23 The other big challenge, following on from the role of indicators and performance measures is attributing success to any particular intervention. A recent report looking at a scheme to support troubled families suggested that the high success rate reported officially was not statistically significant.<sup>27</sup> On closer inspection the official report cited uptake of the interventions and users' experiences as positive measures whereas the second report looked at how significant were the changes in the circumstances of people in the programme. A question of a performance indicator versus an outcome measure.
- 3.24 The concept of outcomes in the VCSE is well established driven in part by the demands for outcome based evidence in applications to funders. One such agency, NIACRO, working in the field of rehabilitation and reducing offending analysed groups of offenders with similar social backgrounds and offending behaviours. In conjunction with the PBNI, which provided access to data and statistical analysis, they measured the impact of a programme to reduce reoffending on one group compared to a similarly matched group who were not part of the intervention programme – a control group. They reported the following results:

The one year proven reoffending rate for those who completed the Jobtrack Programme was 20%, compared to 32% of those in the matched sample of similar offenders. This represents a statistically significant difference ( $F(1,412) = 7.927, p < 0.05$ ).

In the current analysis we can therefore say that evidence indicates that completing the Jobtrack programme reduced the one year reoffending rate by between <1 and 24 percentage points.

The one year proven reoffending rate for Jobtrack Early Leavers was 31%, compared to 40% found in the matched sample of similar offenders. This also represents a statistically significant difference ( $F(1,972) = 10.225 p < 0.05$ ).

In the current analysis we can therefore say that evidence indicates that even partially completing the Jobtrack programme reduced the one year reoffending rate by between two and 18 percentage points.

- 3.25 This is an extensive approach that took a number of years to develop and considerable co-operation between NIACRO and the PBNI but its value lies in its use of a matched control group and its focus on measuring causality alongside correlation.

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27 National Institute of Economic and Social Research press release on analysis of National Evaluation of the Troubles Families Programme, Final Synthesis Report, by the Department for Communities and Local Government, October 2016  
<http://www.niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/NIESR%20Press%20release%20-%20Trouble%20Families%20Evaluation.pdf>

- 3.26 There are pinch points arising from the outcome based approach – outcomes take time and monitoring and evaluation needs to look at trends. A KPI is just that, an indicator of direction but not destination. The temptation to fall back on KPIs of activity/outputs/targets as absolute measures of performance should be resisted. Where negative indicators arise these should be seen as an opportunity to either design new delivery processes or re-design existing ones to achieve the desired outcomes. They are not necessarily failure. This requires trust between the Oversight Bodies and the delivery agency.
- 3.27 A glance at the PSNI Chief Constable’s report to the NIPB for August and September 2016 sees a preponderance of transactional queries. Accepting that local representatives must examine local issues, it is hard to see how they are a challenge to the achievement of the high level outcomes. Relegating the transactional elements to the status of footnotes with outcomes as the headlines will be the challenge. It also means that outcomes will be examined more often than bi-annually.
- 3.28 **Presentation of the data needs to reflect the outcome approach i.e. more trend analysis and more longitudinal studies.** A positive development on this front is the availability of the Ministry of Justice sponsored DataLab<sup>28</sup> resource which offers organisations access to resources to measure the impact of interventions on re-offending.

## Non-Executive Directors

- 3.29 The non-Executive Directors to whom CJI Inspectors spoke recognised the increased emphasis on strategic direction, risk management and accountability in their role.
- 3.30 A number of non-Executives saw the move to OBA™ as having an impact. To paraphrase one non-Executive;

*‘Performance reporting in the public sector with its concentration on operational KPIs used as the measure of overall performance meant that non-Executives were distanced from corporate performance measures.’*

- 3.31 By their nature outcomes are strategic and the Board will have a major say in their determination. Once reporting success or failure in strategic terms to the Board becomes commonplace, the suggestion was that the linkage between the non-Executive and organisational performance becomes more coherent. The usual arrangements whereby Executives have sole responsibility for operational performance may be lessened when the operational metrics are defined as outcomes that are by their nature strategic.
- 3.32 The availability of adequate management and performance management information was seen as a pre-requisite for any non-Executive and the CJS agencies met this demand with many providing tables for easy dissemination of information. The move to OBA™ was being met with induction to ensure that non-Executives were confident in their analysis of the data being made available and their access to the channels needed to verify and validate said data.

28 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/justice-data-lab>



# Appendices



# Appendix 1: PSNI performance measurement

## Development of 'Report Cards'<sup>29</sup>

- **Performance Measures** – measurable data which helps quantify the impact of a project/ service.
  - How much did we do?
  - How hard did we try?
  - How well did we do it?
  - Is anyone better off?

		Quantity	Quality
Input Effort	Least Important	<b>How much</b> did we do?	<b>Important</b>  <b>How well</b> did we do?
	<b>Most Control</b>		
Output Effect	Important	<b>How much</b> change / <b>effect</b> did we produce?	<b>Most Important</b>  What <b>quality</b> of change / <b>effect</b> did we produce?
	<b>Least Control</b>		

**Partnerships**

29 Adapted from Mark Friedman, "Trying Hard is not Good Enough" ISBN: 9781439237861

## Appendix 2: Terms of reference

### Introduction

Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJI) proposes to undertake an inspection of the availability and use of management and performance management information in the Northern Ireland criminal justice sector. The inspection will focus on two aspects of the use of management and performance management information:

- to support planning, decision-making, delivery, measures of achievement and accountability within organisations, and
- to support governance, accountability, setting priorities and resource allocation outside of organisations.

Within organisations the focus will be on the various systems available, how they deliver information, the decision makers who receive the information and what they do with it. Outwith the organisations the focus of discussions will be on Oversight Bodies, Departmental Boards, non-Executive Boards and Directors and relevant stakeholders. The inspection will not be an audit of the accuracy and completeness of the data in the systems but rather the use to which it is put.

### Context

The use of management information and the systems that support it have been the subject of CJI inspections in the past, although the focus has been on a particular system or within a particular agency as part of a wider inspection. This inspection will look at the wider demands for management information and how performance management is delivered across the criminal justice sector, including the extent to which information is integrated across and within the inspected organisations. The ongoing financial pressures facing the criminal justice sector are well known and an efficient system to help identify priorities and measure success is a first step to achieving more with less resources. Although management and performance management information do not guarantee successful outcomes they nonetheless assist organisations in making the right choices when faced with a range of possible courses of action. Internally agencies are faced with other challenges – such as restructuring in response to local government reform, increases in demand for services, improving the efficiency of built infrastructure and reductions in the workforce. Externally, there is a demand for information that will support strategic planning, enable good governance and assist the allocation and reallocation of resources.



## Aims of the inspection

The broad aims of the inspection are to:

- Scope the range and extent of management and performance management information available to the main criminal justice sector organisations;
- Identify the use of management and performance management information by key decision makers and identify outcomes arising from their decision making;
- Identify the use of management and performance management information by those exercising a challenge or governance role within and outwith organisations;
- Clarify the limitations of management and performance management information being made available to decision makers and those exercising a challenge or governance role both within and outwith organisations; and
- Assess the effectiveness of management and performance management information in supporting governance, accountability and service delivery.

## Methodology

The detailed analysis of management and performance management information will focus on those organisations that have a major delivery role within the criminal justice sector. These will include the:

- PSNI;
- PPS;
- DoJ;
- NICTS;
- PBNI;
- NIPS;
- YJA; and
- LSA.

These bodies will be asked to identify their primary management and performance management systems, the functionality and integration of the systems, primary users, recent outputs and usage.

Inspectors will then carry out interviews with decision makers within organisations and with those charged with governance both within and outwith organisations to establish the availability, reliability and usage of the information.

Inspectors will also analyse suitable case studies of strategic decisions and the role of management information in the decision-making process.

In conducting the inspection, Inspectors will take cognisance of the implications of official statistics regulations for any possible recommendations but will not include the role of official statistics within the inspection *per se*.

## **Design and Planning**

An inventory of the primary management and performance management information systems used by the criminal justice sector will be requested from the various organisations. CJI will issue a tabular questionnaire to identify the system, functionality, reporting protocols and key users. This will form the basis for interviews with decision makers and information users in these bodies.

## **Delivery**

### ***Stakeholder consultation***

The management and performance management information systems used by partner agencies, Oversight Bodies and voluntary and community organisations will not be assessed as part of this inspection but they will be consulted as part of the inspection process.

### ***Development of fieldwork plan***

CJI will liaise with contact points in each organisation to arrange a series of meetings and focus groups with relevant officials and Directors. CJI will plan a series of walk through of the management and performance management information systems to understand the processes and outputs. CJI will compile an inventory of the primary management and performance management information systems in the inspected organisations.

### ***Feedback***

On conclusion of the fieldwork the evidence will be collated, triangulated and analysed and emerging recommendations will be developed. CJI will then present the findings to the relevant bodies.

### ***Drafting of report***

Following completion of the fieldwork and analysis of data, a draft report will be shared with the inspected bodies for factual accuracy check. The Chief Inspector will invite the inspected bodies to complete an action plan within six weeks to address the recommendations and if the plan has been agreed and is available it will be published alongside the final inspection report. The inspection report will be shared, under embargo, in advance of the publication date with the inspected bodies.

## **Publication and Closure**

A report will be sent to the Minister of Justice for permission to publish. When permission is received the report will be finalised for publication. A press release will be drafted and shared with the inspected bodies prior to publication and release. A publication date will be agreed and the report will be issued.



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