

# Roads Policing

June 2008

Criminal Justice Inspection  
Northern Ireland  
*a better justice system for all*



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June 2008

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# Contents

List of abbreviations		iv
Foreword		vii
Executive Summary		ix
Recommendations		xi
<b>SECTION 1: INSPECTION REPORT</b>		
Chapter 1	<b>Introduction</b>	3
Chapter 2	<b>Structures and accountability</b>	5
Chapter 3	<b>Reducing road casualties</b>	9
Chapter 4	<b>Investigation of road traffic collisions</b>	27
Chapter 5	<b>Denying criminals the use of the roads</b>	35
Chapter 6	<b>Traffic management</b>	43
<b>SECTION 2: APPENDICES</b>		
Appendix 1	<b>Methodology</b>	48
Appendix 2	<b>Data</b>	50
<b>SECTION 3: RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS</b>		
A	<b>PSNI Action Plan</b>	56
B	<b>DoE Action Plan</b>	59



## List of abbreviations

<b>ACC</b>	Assistant Chief Constable
<b>ACPO</b>	Association of Chief Police Officers
<b>ANPR</b>	Automatic Number Plate Recognition
<b>CAWT</b>	Co-operation And Working Together
<b>CIU</b>	Continuous Improvement Unit
<b>CJ</b>	Criminal Justice
<b>CJI</b>	Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland
<b>DCI</b>	Detective Chief Inspector (in PSNI)
<b>DCU</b>	District Command Unit (in PSNI)
<b>DoE</b>	Department of the Environment
<b>DPP</b>	District Policing Partnership
<b>DRD</b>	Department for Regional Development
<b>DVA</b>	Driver Vehicle Agency
<b>DVLA</b>	Driver Vehicle Licensing Agency
<b>DVLNI</b>	Driver Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland
<b>DVTA</b>	Driver Vehicle Testing Agency
<b>EHS</b>	Environment and Heritage Service
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FLO</b>	Family Liaison Officer
<b>FoI</b>	Freedom of Information
<b>FPN</b>	Fixed Penalty Notice
<b>FPCC</b>	Fixed Penalty Processing Centre
<b>FSNI</b>	Forensic Science Northern Ireland
<b>GB</b>	Great Britain
<b>GBI</b>	Grievous Bodily Injury
<b>HGV</b>	Heavy Goods Vehicle
<b>HMIC</b>	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
<b>HMRC</b>	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
<b>ICIS</b>	Integrated Criminal Information System
<b>IPCC</b>	Independent Police Complaints Commission
<b>IRT</b>	Incident Response Team
<b>KSIs</b>	Killed and Seriously Injured
<b>LEA</b>	Law Enforcement Agency
<b>MIB</b>	Motor Insurance Bureau
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MSF</b>	Most Similar Force



<b>NI</b>	Northern Ireland
<b>NIA</b>	Northern Ireland Assembly
<b>NIAO</b>	Northern Ireland Audit Office
<b>NICtS</b>	Northern Ireland Court Service
<b>NIFRS</b>	Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service
<b>NIM</b>	National Intelligence Model
<b>NIO</b>	Northern Ireland Office
<b>NIPB</b>	Northern Ireland Policing Board
<b>NPIA</b>	National Police Improvement Agency (formerly Centrex)
<b>NIRSS</b>	Northern Ireland Road Safety Strategy
<b>OCU</b>	Operational Command Unit (in PSNI)
<b>OPONI</b>	Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland
<b>PAC</b>	Public Accounts Committee
<b>PACE</b>	Police and Criminal Evidence
<b>FACTS</b>	Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety
<b>PIKE</b>	Police Intelligence Kommercial Enquiry system
<b>PNC</b>	Police National Computer
<b>PPS</b>	Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland
<b>PSNI</b>	Police Service of Northern Ireland
<b>RDIM</b>	Road Death Investigation Manual
<b>RM</b>	Resident Magistrate
<b>RoI</b>	Republic of Ireland
<b>RP</b>	Roads Policing
<b>RSA</b>	Road Safety Authority (in RoI)
<b>RSS</b>	Road Safety Strategy
<b>RTC</b>	Road Traffic Collision
<b>SIO</b>	Senior Investigating Officer
<b>SLA</b>	Service Level Agreement
<b>SPD</b>	State Pathologist's Department
<b>SPECS</b>	Speed Enforcement Camera System
<b>TISPOL</b>	European Traffic Police Network
<b>TCG</b>	Tasking and Co-ordination Group
<b>TSG</b>	Tactical Support Group
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>VED</b>	Vehicle Excise Duty
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation
<b>VOSA</b>	Vehicle and Operator Services Agency



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## Foreword

Roads Policing is an ideal topic for inspection. The function is evolving from what was traditionally an exclusive 'traffic' role to one which includes broader crime detection and tackling anti-social behaviour. It is increasingly being delivered by non-police bodies which specialise in areas such as motor tax evasion, commercial vehicle licensing and parking enforcement.


It is Roads Policing which is at the forefront of reducing the unacceptably high numbers of roads deaths and serious injuries. Increased and targeted enforcement, linked to continued progress on education, can make a significant contribution to road safety.

Many of the problems encountered by Roads Policing in Northern Ireland are shared by the Republic of Ireland. Indeed, border areas in both jurisdictions have much higher rates of road deaths than other areas and there is a special concern to deny criminals the use of the roads across the border. CJI and HMIC have therefore linked up with An Garda Síochána Inspectorate to deliver a co-ordinated and co-operative inspection.

The Inspection team appreciate the support and co-operation of all Roads Policing personnel during this inspection and welcome the commitment of management to implementing the recommendations. We are pleased to incorporate the action plans prepared by the PSNI and the DoE as part of this report.



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June 2008

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## Executive Summary

Roads Policing (RP) is in transition from what was traditionally a 'traffic' function delivered primarily by police, to a service that is now becoming more integrated with crime and undertaken by a range of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Effective partnerships are therefore becoming more critical to the achievement of key objectives such as improving road safety.

Inspectors found a fragmentation in ownership and leadership of RP/enforcement in the PSNI. Responsibility for RP is currently split amongst four Assistant Chief Constables. Inspectors are recommending a consolidation of ownership as part of the current restructuring within the PSNI and a coming together of its policy and operations functions. An earlier inspection of the Department of the Environment (DoE) and the Driver and Vehicle Agency (DVA) recommended the development of an integrated Enforcement Unit within the DVA and the need to make RP/enforcement core business through incorporation in Corporate and Business Plans.

The biggest and most important challenge for RP is to improve road safety and reduce the high numbers of deaths and serious injuries on the roads. While the positive trend of recent years has continued in terms of fatal collisions, the number of serious injuries did rise significantly in 2006 following reductions in the previous five years (see Appendix 2). Those using border roads are facing an even higher risk of death and serious injury. More robust enforcement action can make a difference in tackling speeding and impaired driving in particular. The fear of being caught and prosecuted needs to be elevated, especially among those high risk groups.

Inspectors are concerned that the present arrangements for investigating fatal and serious Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) are weak and need to be addressed urgently through the establishment of a specialist crash and collision unit. This should be located within RP and should be fully operational within two years. A small cadre of RTC Senior Investigating Officers should be established as an immediate interim measure.

A greater integration of traffic and crime functions within the PSNI can be achieved by increased collaboration between RP officers and District Command Units. Better use and application of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) is necessary. The benefits of the significant investment in Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) vehicle tracking systems in the PSNI and DoE must be realised through seeking advice and best practice.



Practical cross border co-operation between the PSNI and An Garda Síochána as well as other Law Enforcement Agencies is helping to reduce road casualties and crime, particularly along the border. Inspectors welcome the strategic and operational linkages which are leading to joint operations to tackle issues such as drink driving and the illegal transport of waste. These operations can be enhanced through the proposed joint protocol and can help to address weaknesses such as information sharing.

Responsibility for the management of traffic flow has diversified in recent years with the involvement of other Law Enforcement Agencies and the private sector. The PSNI, in co-operation with other partners, should renew their policies on traffic management and implement better co-ordination arrangements.



## Recommendations

- Ownership and strategic leadership for Roads Policing should rest with one ACC with continuity in tactical command through a dedicated and experienced Chief Superintendent who is centrally based and supported by a broad based experienced management team. Policy and operations should be combined (paragraph 2.6).
- The PSNI should implement the Association of Chief Police Officers advised speed thresholds (paragraph 3.12).
- A lowering of the drink drive limit should be simultaneously introduced on both sides of the border (paragraph 3.17).
- The joint PSNI/An Garda Síochána protocol should be used to enhance the co-operation and communication at operational level and facilitate sharing of information for roads policing purposes (paragraph 3.39).
- PSNI should set up a properly resourced unit for fatal and serious vehicle crashes and collisions, to reflect the service that currently exists in Great Britain i.e. a dedicated crash and collision investigation unit. A sufficient number of roads policing staff should be adequately trained in collision investigation, commensurate with training provided in England and Wales and which follows the Association of Chief Police Officers Road Death Investigation Manual. The unit should be fully operational within two years (paragraph 4.25).
- The formation of a small cadre of highly trained fatal and serious Road Traffic Collision Senior Investigating Officers should be implemented as a priority action (paragraph 4.26).
- The PSNI should seek to update their ANPR strategy to reflect best practice developed in England and Wales (paragraph 5.24).
- The partner organisations for the Road Safety Strategy should renew their policies on traffic management and implement co-ordination arrangements to manage the free flow of traffic for planned and spontaneous road closures (paragraph 6.11).



## **DoE**

### **(as contained in 'Enforcement in the DoE')**

- *The DoE should develop and publish a clear statement of intent on enforcement in relation to any breaches and/or offences of road traffic law. This should be incorporated into the DoE and DVA Corporate and Business Plans.*
- *An integrated enforcement unit should be established within the DVA.*
- *A performance management framework should be developed to ensure that enforcement operations meet strategic objectives. The framework should include policies; procedures; risk analysis; and SMART performance targets. Clear procedures must be in place to ensure the independence of the regulatory function so that enforcement staff are not subject to political and other internal/external pressures.*
- *As part of its ongoing re-organisation, the DVA should review the existing administrative systems and processes for compliance and enforcement, and develop a set of procedures and processes to produce a more streamlined and efficient service.*
- *Enforcement staff should receive training, work experience, job shadowing and skill enhancement to deliver the required standards. It will also require new staff to be selected and recruited to fill gaps in areas such as criminal investigations and the broader strategic management of enforcement.*
- *A structured framework of SLAs, MoUs, protocols and bi-lateral agreements should be put in place for the strengthening of partnerships within the DoE family, other LEAs and with similar cross-jurisdictional organisations in GB and the RoI.*
- *The DVA should establish effective mechanisms to draw upon and learn from best practice on enforcement.*

## **PSNI/SPD**

### **(as contained in 'Review of the State Pathologist's Department' and 'A Review of Scientific Support Services in the PSNI')**

- *A formal protocol should be agreed between the SPD and the PSNI.*

Section



# Inspection Report



# Introduction



- 1.1 The policing of the roads is evolving from a function predominately undertaken by ‘traffic’ police to what is now a more complex range of enforcement and education activities which are delivered by police in conjunction with other Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). The nature of the work is also changing as the traditional responsibilities of dealing with road traffic offences, managing and investigating Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) and ensuring effective traffic flow, have been joined by an emphasis on denying criminals the use of the roads, tackling terrorism and reducing anti-social behaviour. Roads Policing (RP) is the term now commonly used within the United Kingdom (UK) to describe this enhanced and broader function. While this inspection is primarily focused on the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), it also covers the Driver and Vehicle Agency (DVA) and draws upon recent CJI inspections of *Enforcement in the Department of the Environment (DoE)*, *Forensic Science Northern Ireland (FSNI)* and the *State Pathologist’s Department*. The fieldwork included input from the relevant criminal justice agencies and key stakeholders.
- 1.2 The changing nature of RP makes it increasingly difficult to assess the relative importance attached to it by organisations such as the PSNI. Most UK police forces allocated up to 15% of their resources to traffic duties in the 1980s. This has now fallen back to less than 5%, though it is argued that RP now involves other police officers, that some of its functions have been diversified amongst other statutory and private enforcement organisations, and that advances in technology mean that it now plays an increasing role in detection and prosecution.
- 1.3 The strategic context for RP is set out in the PSNI Annual Report and Corporate/Business planning cycle. It is heavily focused on reducing road casualties as part of the partnership approach to delivering the Northern Ireland Road Safety Strategy (RSS). It is also aligned with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) roads policing strategy with an increasing emphasis on seeking integration with broader crime detections in District Command Units (DCUs). Enforcement in the DoE is included in its Corporate and Business Plans.



# Structures and accountability



## Organisational Structures

- 2.1 There are two broad types of institutional structures for RP – a centralised unit with responsibility for enforcement and education across an organisation; and a devolved arrangement where responsibility and functions are delivered across a number of regional, divisional or operational units, though often supported by a central policy section.
- 2.2 Policy in the PSNI rests with the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) for Operational Support within a centralised Development Branch. Operations are delivered within the two 'regional' Operational Command Units (OCUs) under the command of the two ACCs responsible for Urban and Rural regions. The OCUs are managed from the centre and are not accountable to the local DCU. The criminal aspect of roads policing, including the use of fixed site Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras, rests with the ACC for Crime Operations. Ownership for Roads Policing is therefore split across four ACCs.
- 2.3 The RP Development Branch is headed by a Superintendent and provides a support service in relation to new legislation, road safety initiatives, equipment and policies.
- 2.4 It has no responsibility for RP operations.
- 2.4 The urban OCUs are based at Castlereagh, Newtownards and Antrim. The Rural OCUs are in Maydown, Ballymena, Omagh, Portadown and Saintfield. The most senior officer dealing with RP day-to-day operational matters within each OCU is a Chief Inspector, though they will also cover for the Tactical Support Group (TSG) lead officer when not available. Each OCU will deliver its own RP activities as well as respond to bids from the local DCUs. Some DCUs have also established their own 'mini' RP units to address specific needs. For example, Newry has an internal roads policing team consisting of two motorcyclists who provide increased visibility, community safety and talks to schools.
- 2.5 The Crime Operations Department is responsible for developing strategy, policies and the implementation of ANPR. ANPR is increasing being used as a tool for RP and a key factor in bringing together traffic and crime.
- 2.6 Inspectors are concerned that the delivery of RP is impeded by overly complex accountability arrangements and would recommend that **ownership and strategic**



**leadership for Roads Policing should rest with one ACC with continuity in tactical command through a dedicated and experienced Chief Superintendent who is centrally based and supported by a broad based experienced management team. Policy and operations should be combined.**

- 2.7 Inspectors are aware of the ongoing review of structures within the Service (CORE project) and would advise that the above recommendation is included and implemented within the scope of this project.
- 2.8 The PSNI has a RP Strategy which was issued in 2003 and will be subject to review in 2007-08. There is therefore an opportunity to provide greater clarity and corporate vision to reinforce the message that RP is core police business focused on traffic and crime. Raising the profile of RP should be a priority and achieved through better integration with the tasking and co-ordination process in the DCUs. It is the view of Inspectors that RP is often marginalised within the DCUs and not considered part of the strategic assessment under the National Intelligence Model (NIM).
- 2.9 The DoE and its executive agency the Driver and Vehicle Agency (DVA) have statutory responsibilities for important parts of RP. The DoE Road Safety Division is responsible for promoting road safety, training and educating road users, producing the Highway Code, producing policy and legislation and monitoring the

performance of the DVA. The DVA was established through the merger of Driver Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland (DVLNI) and the Driver Vehicle Testing Agency (DVTA) in April 2007 with responsibility for licensing and testing of vehicles and drivers.

- 2.10 CJI published an inspection report on enforcement in the DoE in October 2007 and made a recommendation on strategic vision and leadership: ***The DoE should develop and publish a clear statement of intent on enforcement in relation to any breaches and or offences of road traffic law. This should be incorporated into the DoE and DVA Corporate and Business Plans.***
- 2.11 In the interests of greater cohesion and integration of enforcement, ***an integrated enforcement unit should be established within the DVA.***

### **Accountability**

- 2.12 The Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) is the primary mechanism for public accountability of the PSNI and local concerns are raised and feed through its local District Policing Partnerships (DPPs). Meetings with representatives (elected and employees) of a number of DPPs reveal that RP, particularly in relation to road safety, is a key concern in many communities. There were however some frustrations about a lack of access to RP operational officers who, at least in some DPPs, rarely attended meetings. There was a view that some DCUs did not see RP as a priority even in areas where road deaths are high. One DPP



representative admitted that members were not knowledgeable enough to ask RP questions and that there was a need for training and improved information.

- 2.13 Inspectors would support a move towards the establishment of a Road Safety Committee within the NIPB which could link into any sub-committees that would be established in local DPPs.
- 2.14 The Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) has recently established an informal cross party group on road safety. While its powers are limited, it has raised the profile of road safety within the Assembly and is a valuable forum for additional accountability. The issue of road safety is also a periodical topic for other formal committees such as Environment and Public Accounts. Devolution of criminal justice will by necessity require enhanced accountability arrangements for the broader range of RP functions.
- 2.15 The enforcement functions of the DoE are subject to inspection and audit and the head of the organisation was recently called to give evidence to the NIA Public Accounts Committee (PAC). PSNI also accepted an invitation to present evidence to this PAC meeting.



# Reducing road casualties



## Openness and accountability

- 3.1 Death on the roads of Northern Ireland is a major problem. The extent is evident through various comparisons – that 7,291 people died on the roads in the same period that the Troubles claimed 3,331 deaths (1969-2001); that road collisions are a main cause of death among the young; that Northern Ireland has more road deaths per capita and number of motor vehicles than England, Scotland or Wales and that children are three times more likely to be killed in Northern Ireland compared to Great Britain (GB) or the Republic of Ireland (RoI).<sup>1</sup>
- 3.2 Data published by the PSNI in relation to 2007 show that 112 people were killed, which is 14 less than 2006 and the lowest yearly figure since records began in 1931. Recent data on injuries have not been made available as yet. The figures for 2006 show that there were 1,211 serious injuries and 7,845 slight injuries which represented a 13% increase compared to the previous year.
- 3.3 The primary response of Government has been the development of a Northern Ireland Road Safety Strategy (2002-2012) which has set targets to reduce those Killed and Seriously Injured (KSI).<sup>2</sup> The strategy and the targets are closely based on the Great Britain (GB) Road Safety Strategy. Both strategies also link to a European Union (EU) target to achieve a 50% reduction in fatalities by 2010, though this is unlikely to be achieved as many Central and Eastern European countries are making little progress in reducing very high casualty rates.
- 3.4 The setting of the KSI targets for Northern Ireland has come under criticism in a recent Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO) report and subsequent PAC hearings and report.<sup>3</sup> The main criticism is that a less challenging target was set for Northern Ireland despite a higher KSI rate compared to GB. The target is to reduce by 2012, road deaths and serious injury by 33% from the 1996-2000 average of 1750 per annum to about 1200. The GB target is a 50% reduction. The target to reduce by

1 Comparative data on road deaths across the UK and the Republic of Ireland relates to 2005.

2 Northern Ireland Road Safety Strategy 2002-2012, published by the DoE, 2002

3 Report on Northern Ireland's Road Safety Strategy, Public Accounts Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly, October 2007



50% the number of children killed or seriously injured from 250 per year to less than 125 by 2012 is the same as GB. The NIAO and PAC reports also expressed concern about the high casualty rate among 17-24 year olds and commented on the absence of a specific target for reducing them.

3.5 The increasing importance of road safety was confirmed in the new NI Programme for Government agreed in January 2008 which established the promotion of safer roads as one of 23 public service agreements. The aim is to 'deliver a safer roads network and achieve measurable reductions in road deaths and serious injury'. The Programme restated the existing RSS targets including maintaining the period 1996-2000 as the baseline. It is expected that the review of the strategy which was announced by the Minister of the Environment will consider the relevance of the current targets and may assess other indicators of performance improvement. The Assembly held a debate on road deaths in November 2007 which followed a report from the PAC on the road safety strategy. This PAC report stated that *'it will no longer accept procrastination on road safety'*. The political parties are also developing their own policies in relation to road safety.

3.6 Most road traffic collisions are caused by human behaviour – a recent Audit Commission report stated that road conditions and

vehicle defects are involved in fewer than 20% of collisions.<sup>4</sup> Data collected on collisions in Northern Ireland shows that only 5% of collisions are not due to human behaviour. The Northern Ireland omnibus survey in 2007 found that 85% of respondents considered 'people speeding' as one of the three most important factors in causing injuries and deaths on the roads.<sup>5</sup> The other main factors are 'people driving after drinking' (66% of respondents) and 'carelessness on roads' (53% of respondents). Changing the behaviour of all road users is a complex process involving a range of educational and enforcement actions.

### Excess Speed

3.7 Road traffic collision data for 2006 shows that excess speed having regard to conditions was responsible for 24% of KSIs and 46 of the 126 deaths in Northern Ireland. A longer term analysis for the period 2002-2006 shows 176 deaths and 1,258 serious injuries attributed to excessive speed which represents 25% of deaths and 20% of serious injuries.

3.8 Research published by the UK Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) show that cutting average speeds by 1mph cuts average crash frequency by around 5%.<sup>6</sup> Different approaches are being tried to reduce speed such as better targeting of those most at risk –

<sup>4</sup> Changing Lanes – evolving roles in road safety, Audit Commission, February 2007

<sup>5</sup> NI omnibus survey May 2007 as reported in The Northern Ireland Road Safety Monitor 2007, DoE, February 2008

<sup>6</sup> Research and Policy – have we got the balance right?, PACTS, Occasional Research Reports. Research conducted by TRL.



research shows that young males are more likely to speed and be involved in collisions. This targeting includes education programmes delivered through schools and advertisement campaigns focused on younger drivers. Enforcement of speeding is less targeted at specific groups of people and more focused on high risk locations. The omnibus survey found significant differences regarding enforcement of speeding with 46% of men and 37% of women stating that they are unlikely/very unlikely to be stopped by the police if exceeding the speed limit.<sup>7</sup>

- 3.9 The targeting of high risk locations for speeding is primarily based on analysis of collision data though it may also reflect local public concerns. The PSNI publicise the location of selected sites/routes for its fixed and mobile cameras. Technology is a key driver in that it allows the police to measure the speed of vehicles through the use of devices such as hand held radar and cameras. The latter has been widely rolled-out across GB with advocates pointing to a significant reduction in collisions at these camera sites<sup>8</sup> – locations selected on the basis of higher collision rates. Opponents argue that the fixed cameras do little to change wider driver behaviour and they are essentially a revenue raising mechanism. The fact that the cameras are usually brightly coloured and

visible and that revenue from speed and red light cameras has been put back into road safety measures (generally the further roll-out of more cameras) has not convinced all sections of the public.

- 3.10 The proposed roll-out of new speed enforcement technology in Northern Ireland can learn important lessons from the GB experience. Determining the location of any device, whether that is a fixed or mobile camera, should be based on the most up-to-date and reliable collision data and linked into the NIM process. A decision on high visibility/covert cameras needs to take account of public acceptance of the need for greater enforcement. Surveys of public attitudes show that many people regard speeding as very serious though this varies due to factors such as how far a driver exceeds the limit and the location of the vehicle (e.g. there is less tolerance for speeding in built up areas).<sup>9</sup> The type of camera is critical – the common Gatso<sup>10</sup> camera is best suited to enforcement of specific sites and accounts for around 90% of all fixed speed cameras in England and Wales. The newly available route speed enforcement technology, such as the SPECS<sup>11</sup> average speed cameras on the A1 outside Newry, are better able to change driver behaviour over longer distances.

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7 NI omnibus survey May 2007 as reported in The Northern Ireland Road Safety Monitor 2007, DoE, February 2008

8 An evaluation of the Safety Camera Scheme, published in December 2006, found that there was a 41% reduction in the number of KSI collisions at selected sites from 2003-06. Overall KSI collisions reduced by 21% in the same period.

9 See omnibus survey undertaken in May 2006 by ipsos MORI on behalf of Navigator Blue and NI omnibus survey May 2007 as reported in The Northern Ireland Road Safety Monitor 2007, DoE, February 2008.

10 The Gatso camera was invented by Maurice Gatsonides.

11 SPECS is the only average speed camera system which has received UK Home Office Type Approval. Other manufacturers have developed similar products but have not got UK approval as yet.



3.11 Speed cameras also have limitations – they are of little use in detecting other traffic offences and some captured data can not be further processed as it will include ‘foreign’ vehicle registrations. The use of any revenue raised from speed detection needs to be carefully considered. The GB experience of a Safety Camera Cost Recovery Scheme which linked revenue from cameras to the funding of Safety Camera Partnerships was brought to an end in March 2007. It is now funded by the Department for Transport through the Local Transport Plans system.<sup>12</sup>

3.12 Inspectors are in agreement with the findings of the recent Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO) report that the speed thresholds or tolerances in Northern Ireland should be the same as applied in England and Wales police forces. It is recommended that **the PSNI should implement the Association of Chief Police Officers advised speed thresholds.** Discussions with senior management in the PSNI have indicated that this recommendation will be accepted and included in the PSNI Action Plan.

3.13 It is likely that the roll-out of more speed detection cameras and the implementation of the ACPO advised speed thresholds will result in a significant increase in the number of Fixed Penalty Notices (FPNs) for speeding offences, though this needs to be balanced against the predicted change in driving behaviour. The fixed penalty procedure was established to

provide a highly cost effective way of dealing with common road traffic offences without the need for automatic court proceedings.

3.14 The PSNI Fixed Penalty Processing Centre (FPPC) is based at Lisnasharragh and employs 33.5 staff of which just one is a police officer. It processes non-endorsable (fine but no penalty points) and endorsable fixed penalty (fine and penalty points) notices. The FPPC also processes all safety camera detections and driving documents produced by motorists. The FPPC processed around 160,000 documents in 2006 (168,000 in 2005). The majority (94,000) relate to non-endorsable notices which include parking offences. As parking is now a civil offence and dealt with by the Department for Regional Development (DRD), FPPC resources should now be freed up to deal with other offences. It is difficult to make comparisons with other similar units in GB as each police area has different rules and approaches to dealing with fixed penalty notices. However, insufficient capacity within the FPPC should not be allowed to act as a restraint to the expansion of enforcement, particularly in relation to speeding offences.

3.15 Inspectors are reassured that the internal PSNI Continuous Improvement Unit is examining the processes of the FPPC. A more efficient FPPC can be achieved by a movement towards the electronic capturing of data at the roadside and then within the FPPC.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Second Review of the Government's Road Safety Strategy*, DfT p.50.

<sup>13</sup> See Post Implementation Review – *Fixed Penalty Processing Centre*, Northern Ireland Policing Board, July 2007.

## Impaired driving

- 3.16 Road traffic collision data for 2006 shows that impaired driving was responsible for 10% of KSIs and 18 deaths. In the period 2002-2006, 137 deaths and 650 serious injuries are attributed to alcohol or drugs – driver/rider which represents 19% of deaths and 10% of serious injuries. A survey of attitudes to various offences in NI, found that drink driving was considered as very serious by 80% of respondents.<sup>14</sup>
- 3.17 Drink driving campaigns have succeeded in changing behaviour and public attitudes to drink driving though a hard core are still not complying with the law. The introduction of breath testing for all Road Traffic Collisions (RTCs) is a positive response and could be strengthened through more use of random breath testing. Random breath testing is founded on the basis of increasing the ‘fear’ of being caught. A recent survey found that 87% of respondents said that the police should be able to stop people at random and breathalyse them for driving under the influence of alcohol.<sup>15</sup> Combining more effective enforcement with a change in the legislation would deliver a strong message that drink driving is not acceptable. NI and the RoI are each considering lowering the drink drive limit from 80mg to 50mg per 100ml of blood. This would bring both jurisdictions into line with all EU countries except GB. As a proactive road safety measure, Inspectors would advise close collaboration with

the Republic of Ireland on this issue and would recommend that a **lowering of the drink drive limit should be simultaneously introduced on both sides of the border**. This would send a clear message to all road users, avoid the problems associated with the application of different laws and enforcement in each jurisdiction, and help protect road users in border areas.

- 3.18 The enforcement of drug driving is more problematic as there is a broad range of illegal and legal over the counter drugs which can seriously impair driving. RP have informed Inspectors that Roadside Screening devices for drug driving will not be available to purchase for operational use for at least 3-5 years. It is clear that driving under the influence of drugs is increasing as data from forensic pathologists and coroner inquests show that around 20% of drivers and riders killed on the roads have traces of impairing drugs in their blood.

## Careless driving

- 3.19 The single biggest category of death and serious injury is careless driving which is a composite list of factors such as heedless of traffic, inattention, overtaking without care, wrong course or position. It accounts for 47% of KSI casualties in 2006 and 40 deaths. In the period 2002-2006, 244 deaths and 3,089 serious injuries are attributed to careless driving. This represents 34% of deaths and 49% of serious injuries. A more visible presence of the police and other

<sup>14</sup> Omnibus survey undertaken in May 2006 by ipsos MORI on behalf of Navigator Blue.

<sup>15</sup> The Northern Ireland Road Safety Monitor 2007, DoE, February 2008



LEAs on the roads is the main deterrent against these offences linked to more robust investigation and prosecution of offenders by the criminal justice system.

### Non-wearing of seatbelts

3.20 Seat belt usage has risen from around 80% in the mid 1980s to 95% according to a 2007 DoE survey. This has been achieved by more enforcement, education and in-vehicle devices. The use of a seat belt is often the difference between life and death with a PSNI analysis of deaths in cars showing that almost 30% were not wearing a belt and a further 26% is unknown whether the occupant was wearing a seat belt. Separate analysis of casualties (2000-04) showed that fatalities were eight times greater among vehicle occupants who were not wearing seat belts.<sup>16</sup>

3.21 Police officers are currently exempt from wearing their seat belts both on and off duty by virtue of legislation. The non-wearing of seatbelts, particularly when off-duty, has a number of implications. As well as sending a contradictory message to the general public on road safety, it is also putting officers at higher risk of serious injury from collisions. Indeed, the Service policy notes that if an officer is involved in a collision where a seat belt is not worn and there is a suggestion that the injuries sustained may have been prevented or lessened by wearing a seat belt, this could result in a reduction in damages.

3.22 The Service policy is that seatbelts should be worn under 'all normal circumstances' but allows for a degree of judgement by officers. The expressed position is that non-wearing of seat belts should be 'seen as being the exception rather than the rule'. Inspectors were told and observed that certain officers interpret this judgement in its broadest sense and some rarely wear a seat belt either off or on-duty. The legislative position means that any sanction for non-adherence to the policy is unlikely.

3.23 Inspectors are encouraged by the response of senior management to review this practice and specifically to ask the DoE to amend the legislation to remove the off-duty exemption for police officers. Any exemptions for an off-duty officer will require the approval of a senior officer. There is no proposal to amend the legislation on wearing seat belts on duty which would be in line with the legislative position in GB and the RoI. However, Inspectors would strongly advise a more robust adherence to the current policy guidance as the duty to care requirements clearly outweigh any other concerns – vehicle manufactures state that in-vehicle safety such as airbags only work effectively in conjunction with the wearing of seatbelts.

### Vehicle underclass

3.24 Vehicles which are defined as the 'underclass' are likely to be untaxed, unlicensed, uninsured and

<sup>16</sup> An analysis of seat belt wearing in Northern Ireland, 2000-2004, PSNI.



unroadworthy, and many are used for criminal activities. A recent change in calculating Vehicle Excise Duty evasion<sup>17</sup> means that the numbers of such vehicles is likely to be much less than the previously estimated figure of 45,000. A key target from the DoE Corporate Plan 2006-08 and the DVA is 'through multi-agency operations, to remove 8,000 unlicensed vehicles from the public roads by 2008.' Research of Driver Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) records in GB showed that unlicensed drivers committed 25% of all insurance offences, 13% of drink/drive offences, 26% of reckless or dangerous driving offences, and 50% of all theft or unauthorised taking offences.

- 3.25 The PSNI and the DoE have a critical role in tackling this problem and in particular addressing high risk drivers such as those who are disqualified and those who do not have insurance. Research in GB shows that around 1 in 20 drivers drove uninsured which adds around £30 to all insurance premiums. RP in GB have access to the national Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) database via their ANPR systems. RP officers in the PSNI only have access to the national MIB via radio contact to control room staff. Inspectors support the moves towards having the database of uninsured vehicles loaded onto the ANPR systems and advise the swift implementation of the necessary secondary legislation. The new offence of 'causing death or grievously bodily injury by driving: unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured

drivers' will be inserted into the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 by the Criminal Justice (NI) Order 2008.

### Partnership

- 3.26 A significant reduction in road casualties can not be achieved by any one organisation and requires a joined-up approach by government, its departments and agencies and other non-statutory and voluntary organisations. The ongoing work by international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations (UN) and the EU has provided governments with a framework to tackle this global problem of 1.2 million deaths per year. The UK and RoI governments are working together on recognition of driver disqualification and to give effect to the EU Convention on Driving Disqualifications. Ministers announced in January 2008 that the UK and the RoI will be the first EU Member States to implement the joint recognition of driver disqualification from autumn of 2008. The mutual recognition of penalty points between the UK and RoI is presently the subject of a feasibility study. When completed, the way forward will be considered by officials and recommendations made to Ministers. There is presently no timetable for implementation.
- 3.27 The NIRSS is the clearest example of a local partnership approach. It is founded on the promotion of an integrated approach to the planning,

<sup>17</sup> See Vehicle Excise Duty evasion: 2007, Department for Transport, February 2008.



co-ordination and delivery of road safety activities. The three key partners are the PSNI, the DoE and the DRD Roads Service. A Road Safety Steering Group is chaired by the DoE though it has not met regularly and there is a need to be tighter with action plans.

- 3.28 The NI Safety Camera Scheme Board was established as part of the RSS and is a partnership arrangement which is chaired by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). The NIO is responsible for policing legislation and funding arrangements for the safety camera scheme. Other partners include the DoE road safety branch together with DRD Roads Service and the NI Court Service (NICtS). Legislation which came into effect in 2005 allows the scheme to put cost recovering arrangements into place. One option, which has been used in GB, is to apply full hypothecation where any revenue can be re-cycled (by a local partnership) without having to surrender it to the Treasury. A second option, which is now advocated in England and Wales, is that costs can be funded by direct budgets from government thus breaking the link between revenue from cameras and the funding of this method of enforcement.
- 3.29 The NIO have told Inspectors that a grant of £750,000 has been made available and that they are favourable towards full or partial hypothecation to improve stricter enforcement and changes to working practices. In light of the GB experience with safety camera revenue, Inspectors would urge the Scheme Board to adopt a transparent approach to the funding

of speed detection cameras.

- 3.30 A good partnership arrangement is evident in relation to road safety education activities. The PSNI have Education Officers in place who provide a valuable input to various national and/or local programmes. The *Roadsafe* and *Bikesafe* programmes which run across the UK are assessed as making a considerable impact on participants and are partially funded by the DPPs and Axa Insurance. RP Educational Officers have been innovative in targeting young males through computer courses such as *'Right to Drive, Right to Life'* thus addressing a concern that *Roadsafe* is too focused on schools and that high risk young people are often no longer at school.
- 3.31 Joint operations are a key component of RP and are covered in some detail in the CJI report on enforcement in the DoE. One of the concerns expressed in that report is that the full benefits of joint working are not being realised despite the commitment and support of key people in the PSNI, DoE, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Environment and Heritage Service (EHS) and the Immigration Service. There is therefore a need for all of the key agencies to focus on:
- developing a protocol of joint working;
  - providing for a more effective exchange of information and intelligence;
  - better planning of operations so that cancellations are minimised; and
  - full debriefing of joint operations as a learning opportunity.

3.32 Inspectors welcome the PSNI/DVA liaison meetings involving senior staff to discuss better co-operation and would encourage further dialogue with a view to resolving these types of issues and formalising the relationship through a Service Level Agreement (SLA).

### Cross Border Co-operation

3.33 The issue of road safety is a major concern on both sides of the border as both jurisdictions have similar high levels of deaths and serious injuries. Referring to the 'Carnage on the roads', an Irish newspaper editorial concluded that 'We need tough drink-driving laws; we need stricter enforcement and, most of all, we need to modify our own behaviour.'<sup>18</sup> The situation in border areas in both jurisdictions is even worse as research undertaken for Co-operation and Working Together (CAWT) shows that road casualties are 33% higher than other areas. There is no consensus on why the problem is so acute in border areas, though it is likely to be a combination of factors such as poor quality driving, the condition of the roads, a culture of speeding/drink driving and most importantly a deficit in RP enforcement for many years. Differences in legislation and practices on both sides of the border have created additional problems.

3.34 The principal governmental response on a north/south basis is through the joint Ministerial Council. The Council through its Transport and Environment Ministers issued a Joint

Communique in September 2007 which agreed to progress mutual recognition of penalty points and continue efforts of joint advertising and publicity campaigns. It agreed to share relevant road safety research and improve arrangements for collecting, collating and reporting road safety information.<sup>19</sup>

3.35 The Council also stated that work should continue through the CAWT Steering to Safety project on finding practical ways of improving road safety in border areas. The Steering to Safety project is a partnership involving the PSNI and An Garda Síochána as well as road safety and health promotion organisations. They have issued a report and are now working on some joint implementation activities.

3.36 The improved political context and the growing recognition that common solutions are necessary to address this shared problem are facilitating significant partnerships and joint activities between the two police services. PSNI Road Policing and An Garda Síochána Traffic Bureau are at the forefront in developing these linkages. Twice yearly formal meetings between the Head and Deputy Head of the Garda National Traffic Bureau and the Head and Deputy of PSNI Road Policing Development Branch take place to discuss and review road policing policy and legislative developments. This formal arrangement is supported by varied informal arrangements at all levels within both police organisations.

<sup>18</sup> Irish Times, 5 March 2008.

<sup>19</sup> North/South Ministerial Council Transport Sector, Joint Communique, September 2007.



3.37 Tactical linkages include participation in various EU initiatives such as Operation *Mermaid* (focused on heavy commercial vehicles) and TISPOL (European Traffic Police Network) which runs thematic campaigns such as speed, seat belts and new areas such as young drivers and motorcyclists. There are also examples of joint bi-lateral activities led by PSNI Rural region and An Garda Síochána Traffic Corps from the Northern Division targeting specialised events, bank holidays, problem areas that straddle the border etc. These regions meet on a monthly basis to plan and co-ordinate cross border operations.

3.38 The provision of education and publicity campaigns on road safety have been a joint effort for a number of years and focused on areas such as speeding and drink driving. They have been led by organisations such as the Department of Transport, Road Safety Authority (RSA) and An Garda Síochána in the RoI and by the DoE and the PSNI in NI and now involves government Ministers from both jurisdictions. Both police services have been involved in the launch of these campaigns and there have been 12 cross border road safety campaigns to date. An Garda Síochána has also become directly involved in *Roadsafe* and *Bikesafe* initiatives in border areas of NI.

3.39 There is increasing scope for enhanced cross border co-operation in tackling this common problem, particularly in the border areas where the problem is so serious. Improved linkages can help to address the specific road safety

risks which are caused by different legislation and practices on either side of the border. Inspectors support the ongoing linkages between Roads Policing organisations and recommend that **the joint PSNI/An Garda Síochána protocol should be used to enhance the co-operation and communication at operational level and facilitate sharing of information for roads policing purposes.**

### Equality and fairness

3.40 Securing equality and fairness is a legislative requirement. It means that all activities around RP such as new legislation, strategies and plans and operations need to be compliant with equality laws such as Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act. Section 75 also requires organisations to assess the impact of their actions on the specified groups. However, little data is collected in this area and it is the subject of a separate inspection by CJI. For the purpose of this section of the report, Inspectors wish to outline some risks for RP.

3.41 A concern for Inspectors is that any weaknesses in policies, strategies and operations are likely to produce inequalities in terms of impact. A senior police officer did state at the PAC hearing on road safety that recent Freedom of Information (FoI) has revealed startling statistics where some areas have lower levels of detection and of mobile camera usage. It is therefore critical that approaches such as the National Intelligence Model (NIM) are justified and founded on reliable and up-to-



date information. The recent CJI inspection of enforcement in the DoE reported that *'most operations are random with the only sense of targeting being what time of day the operation runs or the area. Targeting of operations based on named operators does not happen'*.

3.42 The use of the NIM is at the core of current policing in that the business process assists police to determine priorities, decide resources and task officers to tackle problems. It is primarily a tool for the more serious level 2 and level 3 crimes. Inspectors were told by senior management in the PSNI that they are looking to NIM to guide them in relation to issues such as speed camera deployment (fixed and mobile). More extensive use of the NIM for RP would provide for greater transparency and fairness. However, the use of the NIM has been limited to date.

3.43 CJI's report on enforcement in the DoE (and the DVA in particular) referred to how foreign nationals are dealt with by the enforcement system. On one side, there are concerns that the prosecution process for foreign nationals could be unfair unless proper account is taken of language and cultural differences. On the other side, the lack of information on foreign registered vehicles and drivers means that enforcement is less robust and some offenders are not receiving the same level of enforcement as those with UK vehicle registrations and NI driving licences.

3.44 The ease with which foreign registered vehicles, many of which have outstayed their 'visitor status' can drive with apparent immunity on the roads is also a concern for the wider criminal justice system across the UK. As these vehicles are not registered with DVLA in Great Britain or the DVA in Northern Ireland, they can evade many road traffic penalties and charges and are more likely to be used for wider criminality. The Public Accounts Committee in Westminster has recently stated that *'evasion is becoming more sophisticated and international, making it more difficult to tackle'*.<sup>20</sup> Recent legal advice is that foreign registered vehicles which are currently not taxed and registered in their country of origin, are committing a Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) offence in this country if they continue to drive here. Inspectors welcome the development of a DVA strategy to wheelclamp and impound such vehicles and a pilot scheme is in progress in relation to vehicles from Rol, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden.

3.45 The non-applicability of certain enforcement action and penalties against foreign registered drivers has led to consideration and application of alternative solutions. A legislative option is available through the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 which provides for more effective mutual co-operation on driving offences. The European Commission is bringing forward a draft Directive to make it easier to trace foreign drivers who commit road traffic offences and escape

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<sup>20</sup> Evasion of Vehicle Excise Duty, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 14 January 2008.



finer.<sup>21</sup> The UK Department for Transport has also proposed the introduction of a graduated fixed penalty scheme for commercial vehicles which would be accompanied by a deposit scheme for non-UK resident offenders to ensure they do not escape any penalties they incur. Offenders who could not prove UK residency would be required to make an immediate payment at the roadside. The challenge for government is that any alternative schemes should be transparent and proportionate. One Resident Magistrate (RM) who deals with a large number of speeding cases involving ROL drivers expressed these concerns. Since a Fixed Penalty Notice can not be issued to these motorists, they can be arrested, charged and released on bail after paying £200 – £300 to the magistrates' court. The procedure can take several hours.

- 3.46 A recent ACPO roads policing conference discussed the road safety concerns about the increasing number and quality of HGVs on the roads. The problem has led to some bespoke operations such as *Mermaid*. One of the difficulties in the enforcement of HGVs is the specialised expertise required in areas such as digital tachograph analysis for driver's hours, braking systems etc. While the DVA has invested in many of these specialisms, the PSNI are moving away from commercial vehicle checking – officers did comment on their reluctance to stop HGVs even in the

knowledge that many drivers are breaking the law in areas such as non-wearing of seatbelts. A consequence of PSNI retrenchment is that aspects of HGV enforcement are not being achieved and the target on checking the tachographs of 1% of the fleet is unlikely to be achieved. Inspectors would contend that the PSNI and the DVA have a joint responsibility to develop a common programme of enforcement of commercial vehicles.

- 3.47 The PAC expressed concerns that the DoE has gaps in its knowledge about particular groups of road users such as children living in disadvantaged areas and motorcyclists. The Audit Commission report referred to research which showed that the estimated injury rate for child pedestrians is four times higher in the most deprived ward than the least deprived. The DoE did state at the PAC that no research has been done in Northern Ireland on this issue. The Department of Transport statistics show a higher rate of child pedestrian deaths in NI compared to England and Wales – Scotland is higher than NI. There is a need to tackle inequalities as research in GB has shown a clear link between deprivation and road traffic collisions, particularly those involving children as pedestrians or cyclists.

### Learning and best practice

- 3.48 Inspectors were impressed with the strong commitment and dedication of staff working on roads policing in the PSNI and in the DoE. There were

21 *More safety on our roads - equal treatment of resident and non-resident drivers* is an EU Commission proposal for a Directive published on 19 March 2008 aimed at facilitating the cross-border prosecution of traffic offences. Member States will need to establish a data exchange system to make it effective.



some frustrations expressed around a perceived lack of priority for RP/enforcement within their respective organisations and concerns around de-skilling in some specialist functions as well as limited career development opportunities.

3.49 Improved training and the use of best practice are a means of raising the profile of RP and professionalising the service. There are no recognised national occupational standards for RP though various specialisms are developing common qualifications.

3.50 The implementation of the recommendation to bring RP under one ACC should help to deliver some key changes in terms of professionalising the service. Inspectors would wish to see a more robust use of performance management for RP teams. Inspectors were shown evidence in the Rural region of a performance regime being developed and some benchmarking and this could be expanded to include all RP staff. Similarly, enforcement staff in the DoE can benefit from a more dedicated training and career development package. Indeed there is scope for both organisations to develop joint training packages and link in to existing programmes. The PSNI provided bespoke training to DVTA intelligence officers in December 2005 which included an understanding of the NIM, data protection, human rights, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act and the management and analysis of intelligence.

3.51 There are a number of opportunities for PSNI and DVA to demonstrate learning and the use of best practice. Some suggestions include:

- better briefing from joint operations;
- better identification of best practice (should tap into existing analysis and assessments by HMIC rather than ad hoc selections);
- learning from countries which have made significant improvements in road safety (e.g. France and Portugal recorded a 40%+ reduction in road deaths in the period 2001-2006 compared to 7% in the UK and 11% in the RoI) and those with a long history of road safety (such as the Scandinavian countries); and
- better use of local intelligence to inform location and depth of enforcement (e.g. better use of local neighbourhood teams or DCUs).

## Results

3.52 Measuring the impact of RP for road safety is complex as a number of factors can influence any changes. These factors include the interplay between enforcement, education and engineering – there is little doubt that more targeted education and improved road design can lead to improved road safety. There is also growing evidence that better vehicle design and in-car safety systems are protecting more people. Improved medical emergency treatment, including road side assistance is also helping to preserve lives. It is therefore likely that in the absence of any changes in the enforcement regime that improvement could be achieved, particularly in the number of fatal collisions. Though saving more lives could also lead to an



increase in the number of serious injury cases.

- 3.53 However, there is evidence from research and experience from other countries that a step change in reducing road casualties requires a robust and effective application of enforcement. One of the key lessons from France is that strong political determination linked to a robust enforcement of the law can lead to major changes in road user behaviour.
- 3.54 Measuring performance improvement is based on the KSI target methodology. This is the target which has been set by the GB Road Safety Strategy and then adopted and modified by the NIRSS. The target was almost achieved in 2005 with a 31% reduction in KSIs and a 48% reduction in child KSIs. The following year was not as good with a 24% reduction in KSIs and 39% reduction in child KSIs. When compared with 2005, road deaths have decreased by 7% but KSIs have increased by 11%. The trend has continued for 2007 as road deaths have decreased by 9%. Data on KSIs (serious injuries) for 2007 has not been made available. The NIAO report found that there is ongoing debate about the accuracy of injury statistics as Health Service statistics seem to show a higher number compared to those reported by the PSNI, though the problem is not unique to NI.
- 3.55 Inspectors are keen to provide a comparative basis for NI performance on road safety. There are some reservations to these comparisons within the PSNI and the DoE as they point to the unique characteristics of

NI which make benchmarking difficult. The PAC rejected these views in its report and Inspectors agree that appropriate comparisons are a means of better understanding performance.

- 3.56 Table 1 shows that NI is the worst performing region in the UK when compared against a number of different variables such as population and number of motor vehicles. Most concerning is the high rate of child deaths at 3.1 per 100,000 population compared to just over 1 per 100,000 population in GB regions. Figures for 2007 have improved as the number of children killed on the roads has fallen to 5 compared to 9 in the previous year. A comparison with the Republic of Ireland shows NI as slightly better on most indicators, though it also confirms the serious nature of the problem on both sides of the border.
- 3.57 Table 2 is a comparison between the PSNI (NI) and the Most Similar Forces in GB (as used by HMIC in its wider assessments of performance) for 2006. The PSNI is second only to Nottinghamshire in terms of KSIs per 100,000 population, though slightly better in terms of KSIs per 100 million vehicle km travelled.
- 3.58 The DoE report progress against the PSA target on KSIs. They also have internal performance targets in relation to the making of new road safety legislation as well as removing 8000 unlicensed vehicles from the public roads by 2008. Both the DVLNI and the DVTA in their Annual Reports (prior to the merger) have an objective 'to improve compliance' with specific objectives to reduce VED evasion and remove unlicensed

**Table 1: Comparisons of UK regions and Republic of Ireland**

	NI	RoI	England	Scotland	Wales
Road deaths per 100,000 pop:					
2005	7.8	9.6	5.5	5.6	6.1
2006	7.3	8.6	5.4	6.2	5.5
2007	6.4	8.0	—	—	—
Pedestrian deaths per 100,000 population	1.1	1.8	1.1	1.3	1.1
Children (1-14) deaths per 100,000 population	3.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1
Road deaths per 10,000 motor vehicles	1.5	1.8 <sup>22</sup>	1.0	1.1	1.1
KSIs per 100,000 pop (2006)	76.8	N/A	54.3	57.1	46.3
KSIs per 100 million vehicle km	7.03	N/A	6.3	N/A	4.9

(Source: Road Casualties Great Britain: 2006 – Annual Report P.160 for 2005 data and 2006 data on road deaths per 100,000 population. 2007 data calculated by Inspectors).

**Table 2: Comparisons of UK Most Similar Forces<sup>23</sup>**

	PSNI	WM	GMP	WY	NH	Notts
KSIs per 100,000 pop	76.8	52.8	36.6	52.7	43.8	94.3
KSI per 100 million vehicle km	7.03	6.8	5.1	7.5	5.7	8.6

(Source: Road Casualties Great Britain: 2006 – Annual Report with further analysis by HMIC)

vehicles (DVLNI) as well as reduce vehicle test evasion, check commercial vehicles and examine tachographs.

3.59 Progress against these targets is mixed and measuring compliance can be problematic. It is clear that VED and

vehicle test evasion rates are showing a steady decrease over recent years but are still well above the GB equivalents. There has been good progress in relation to the identification and removal of unlicensed vehicles, particularly in

<sup>22</sup> Road Collision Facts Ireland 2006

<sup>23</sup> Most Similar Forces used by HMIC in comparison with PSNI are: West Midlands (WM); Greater Manchester Police (GMP); West Yorkshire (WY); Northumbria Police (NH) and Nottinghamshire (Notts)



the Greater Belfast area and an increase in wheel clamping. The DVTA reported 1,600 prosecutions in 2005-06 compared to 502 in 2006-07 which is attributed by the DVA to a general reduction in VED evasion as well as changes in the enforcement regime including increased focus on advice and warning, education and the introduction of intelligence led enforcement.

3.60 A European Directive<sup>24</sup> places a minimum number of tachograph checks to be conducted by each Member State to help reduce the risk of commercial drivers exceeding their driving hours. The DoE is the 'competent authority' in NI and therefore responsible for the delivery of this target. In the past, the PSNI has made a significant contribution to this target<sup>25</sup> but this is no longer a priority for the police and is not included in any of the NIPB targets. The target is unlikely to be achieved. There is therefore a onus on the DoE and the DVA to develop an implementation plan to deliver this target in Northern Ireland and determine the future contribution of PSNI.

3.61 The PSNI have primary responsibility for the enforcement of driving licenses though DVA enforcement officers also detect and report infringements of driving licences through roadside exercises. There are few prosecutions for driver licence offences, which are taken by the PPS. The penalty for these

infringements is generally to revoke a licence, which is the responsibility of the DVA on the instructions of the Courts and on medical grounds. A specialist identity checking section within the Driver Licensing Division was established in October 2004. It deals with the identification of counterfeit or fraudulently-altered documents and the preparation of evidence and statements for further action, including prosecution, by the PSNI. They deal with 400 applications per month.

3.62 An analysis of prosecutions initiated by the PSNI (see Tables 1 & 2, Appendix 2) shows that excess speed accounted for 6,440 prosecutions and 33,372 fixed penalties (excess speed and fixed site safety camera) in 2007 which was considerably higher than previous years. Drink/drug driving led to just over 5,000 prosecutions in 2007 which was similar to 2006. The non-wearing of seatbelts resulted in 16,292 prosecutions and FPNs in 2007 which was less than the previous year (which can be attributed to higher compliance levels). Careless and dangerous driving, which can include excess speed, led to 9,122 prosecutions and FPNs in 2007 of which over 8,000 relate to careless driving. The PSNI had 1,061 prosecutions driving whilst disqualified and 5,182 for no insurance in 2007 which is less than previous years. Just 29 prosecutions and 33 FPNs were taken against pedal cyclists and 38 prosecutions and 116 FPNs against pedestrians in 2007.

<sup>24</sup> 2006/22/EC

<sup>25</sup> PSNI data on tachograph prosecutions show a significant reduction in recent years with just 654 prosecutions and 76 FPNs in 2006 which will be much reduced in 2007 – the combined total was over 3000 in 2003.



3.63 An analysis of judicial statistics shows that motoring charges account for over half of the total charges brought to the magistrates' courts in Northern Ireland in the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. This dropped to 32% in 2006. Motoring charges are evenly split between major and minor offences. The percentage of charges for fixed penalty defaulters has increased from 4% in 2003 to 10% in 2005 and then dropped back to 4% in 2006. In the period 2003 to 2005 the percentage of youth motoring charges account for over a fifth of the total charges brought to the magistrates' courts. In 2006 the percentage dropped to 11%.

3.64 Data provided by the NICtS shows that between 2003 and 2006 that 51% of adult magistrates' court disposals resulted in a fine. A further 20% were disposed of through a disqualification while 13% received penalty points (see Table 3, Appendix 2). About 4% of disposals resulted in a prison sentence of which half were suspended.

3.65 There is an ongoing debate as to whether the existing legislation is appropriate for road traffic offences. New legislation is being introduced by the DoE on dangerous/careless driving and new secondary legislation will be enacted to seize vehicles for no insurance and no tax. Other sanctions under consideration include the use of graduated penalties and alternative punishments for speeding offences such as the need to undertake speed awareness courses.



# Investigation of road traffic collisions



### Openness and accountability

- 4.1 PSNI recorded data on vehicle collisions in 2006 show that there were 110 separate fatal collisions, 904 serious collisions and 4,614 slight collisions. A total of 126 people died in these collisions. Fatal and serious collisions increased by 5% on 2005 (though fatal collisions have decreased by 13%). The worst location for collisions is Lisburn DCU. Collision data for 2007 is not available as yet though an analysis of fatalities shows that Newry and Mourne and Fermanagh DCUs are the worst locations with 9 fatalities each.
- 4.2 Investigating RTCs is necessary for a number of reasons:
- to identify the cause of the collision as a means of prevention (e.g. through safer road and vehicle design and education initiatives);
  - to provide a service to victims of collisions, particularly relatives of the deceased;
  - to enable the Coroners Service to establish the cause of death and conduct an inquest; and
  - to help determine whether a crime has been committed and produce evidence for any prosecution.

- 4.3 The official guide to the investigation of road traffic collisions resulting in death is the ACPO produced 'Road Death Investigation Manual' (RDIM). It was designed to standardise the investigation of fatal collisions in line with the quality of investigations of murder. Some crashes resulting in serious injury will also be investigated in this way. A new version of the manual was produced in December 2007. The PSNI have a 'NI version' which includes NI legislation and takes account of the role of the Forensic Science Northern Ireland's (FSNI) Specialist RTC Investigation and Reconstruction Unit. Inspectors would expect the PSNI to adopt and use this new version of the manual and would advise absolute adherence to the ACPO version (except for the different legislation). A collision advice booklet to inform the public of RTC investigations has been recently developed and circulated to all operational officers.

### Partnership

- 4.4 Responsibility for the investigation of fatal and serious RTCs is not a function of RP. Instead, the first response is usually from an Incident Response Team (IRT) from the



relevant DCU which then requests expertise from within and outside the PSNI. These specialists include the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO), mappers, photographers, Authorised Officers and Crime Scene Investigators. Forensic scientists from FSNI will be requested for most fatalities. The role of RP is usually as support in the case of their video cars or as the initial response on the motorways. As one RP officer commented: “We report fatalities, we don’t really investigate them.”

4.5 The PSNI contract with FSNI stipulates that scientists are required for 1100 hours per year which equates to approximately 80-90 fatal collisions. This means that not all collisions will have a forensic scientist and it is rare that they are called to serious collisions. The decision on whether to attend a scene is left to the scientist rather than the SIO. SIOs did emphasise the benefits and expertise that highly trained FSNI scientists bring to an investigation and there is little doubt that trained Forensic Collision Investigators are a key element of RTC investigation. There does however remain a gap in terms of being able to forensically re-construct a scene.

4.6 The NI Fire & Rescue Service (NIFRS) have an important role at the scene of RTCs and now have a statutory responsibility to provide equipment and train its personnel for the specific purpose of rescuing and releasing people from road traffic collisions. They are often the first emergency service at a scene and have an important early role in terms of securing the scene (e.g. traffic

management and forensic awareness). NIFRS attended 846 RTCs in 2006-07 and rescued 461 people. NIFRS is developing its own road safety strategy and are keen to have more communication with PSNI in areas such as KSI sites (prevention) and traffic management. A concern for NIFRS is the time spent at RTC scenes as they often need to wait on the investigation to be complete before the removal of a body. They have stated that the time spent at RTCs fatal collision scenes has increased year on year, despite the fall in fatal collision scenes.

4.7 The Northern Ireland Ambulance Service also works closely with the PSNI at RTCs. They reported a positive working relationship with the police in terms of contingency planning and in operational situations. There was a concern that staff are sometimes required to undertake traffic diversions when they first come across non-injury collisions.

4.8 Following a fatal RTC, it is the responsibility of the Coroners Service to request a post mortem examination and determine whether an inquest will be necessary. Both the Coroners Service and the State Pathologist’s Department (SPD) are therefore dependent on the work of the police at these scenes. In the main, there is a good working relationship with these two organisations though Inspectors would wish to see it more formalised. CJI in its inspection report on the SPD and CJI/HMIC in their inspection report on *Scientific Support Services in the PSNI* have recommended that ‘**a formal**

***protocol should be agreed between the SPD and the PSNI***.

Inspectors understand that a protocol has been prepared and is now awaiting the signature of both parties. It should help to address issues such as the need for a single point of contact in each of the DCUs and the practice that the SIO is rarely available to brief the pathologist on the circumstances relating to a death. This responsibility appeared to have been transferred to the Family Liaison Officer (FLO) who very often had not attended the scene.

### Equality and fairness

4.9 The consistent application of the RDIM will help to ensure a fair and equal treatment of all RTC investigations. There will be some differences between RTC investigations due to factors such as location of scene (areas furthest from Belfast will have a slower response where experts such as forensic scientists will need to travel longer distances) and availability of experts such as SIOs. These differences are unavoidable under the present arrangements where many experts are Greater Belfast based and where SIOs have varied levels of experience.

### Learning and best practice

4.10 It is the SIO who has overall management responsibility for an RTC scene and its investigation. The PSNI has stated that 175 officers (mostly Chief Inspectors, Inspectors and Sergeants) are trained as SIOs in a part-time role with a further 40 nearing completion of training. Only nine of these SIOs are from a RP

background. The large number means that many SIOs are unlikely to be required at fatal collisions, though 43 are in roles unlikely to be called. Focus group participants reported to Inspectors that some SIOs had not done an RTC investigation for 'many years' while other young inexperienced staff were dealing with some recent cases. The SIOs currently receive a one-week course for collision scenes but with no additional training in-house. Many GB forces source additional training for their SIOs. There were criticisms from some DCU commanders that the cost of training so many SIOs, who are then rarely used, is not best use of resources.

4.11 The PSNI stated that there are approximately 30 Authorising Officers or Fatal RTC support officers who are mainly based in RP and have responsibility to examine vehicles involved in collisions. They are generally tasked to specific vehicles following a bid to RP from a DCU – a process which was criticised by some DCUs as being too slow and bureaucratic. Authorising Officers did express a need for additional training in areas such as digital tachographs.

4.12 The FLO is a relatively recent role, though officers have been providing a similar service for many years. At present, there are 147 trained FLOs in the PSNI, all of which volunteer for this part-time position. It is a critical role as they represent the public face of RTC investigation and a direct link with families of victims. Indeed, one DCU Commander referred to the 'glowing reports' from the public. There is a need for more consistent



training standards as the current five-day course has no refresher training. There is also no assessment of suitability at training, though some informal assessment is claimed to take place.

- 4.13 Professionalising the investigation of RTCs should be a priority of the PSNI. This can be achieved by linking into ACPO initiatives which are focused on developing consistent standards across the UK entailing recognised training, qualifications and external accreditation. There are also calls for bespoke road death investigation courses. Skills for Justice, which has a base in NI, are also involved in developing national occupational standards (operational standards in the police) and driving improvements through assessments and proper accredited qualifications in road policing.
- 4.14 A key learning opportunity for RTC investigation is the ability to review each case and develop lessons and best practice. Inspectors were told of the practice of a Traffic Management Officer who visits all fatal crash/collision scenes to ascertain if the road structure/condition was a significant contributory factor in the collision. There were also examples of road traffic management officers liaising with DRD in relation to RTC investigations. There is however no case reviews at DCU level which means that any lessons for prevention can be missed.
- 4.15 Inspectors were shown the type of equipment which is used at the scenes of RTC investigations and one

highly experienced crash and collision investigator attached to the inspection team to provide 'expert' advice, did observe the use of this equipment at two RTCs. Inspectors do not support the view of the PSNI self assessment that all relevant equipment is available at each base. It was evident that some of the equipment was outdated (e.g. mapping of scenes) and that some vitally important equipment was simply not available (i.e. suitable lighting to illuminate night time scenes to facilitate effective and timely investigation). The unavailability of suitable lighting meant that there was either a reliance on other services such as the NIFRS or that roads were closed for much longer than necessary to facilitate investigation in conditions that were not as closely ambient to when the collision occurred i.e. that scene investigation was taking place in daylight hours.

- 4.16 The non-availability or non-use of appropriate equipment is presenting a health and safety risk to police and other personnel at RTC scenes. The expert crash and collision investigation Inspector who attended the two scenes observed bad practice in terms of poor road signage, inadequate coning, lack of lighting, the use of unmarked warning vehicles and the non-use of fluorescent jackets by officers at the night scene he attended. Inspectors are aware of PSNI policy in relation to health and safety but would urge greater awareness and adherence by officers on the ground.

## Results

4.17 Performance in relation to RTC investigation can be measured in a number of ways. The key indicator should be the quality of evidence presented to the courts where an offence has been committed. Other indicators include the value of input to Coroner reports and inquests as well as the level of service provided to families of the victims. There is also the wider public service in terms of re-opening the road and minimising the disruption to business and road users.

4.18 As part of the fieldwork element of the inspection, two experienced Inspectors (both with SIO experience), undertook a random sample of 5% of the 262 fatal closed RTC case files covering the period 2005-07 (22 cases). The incident logs of four separate fatal RTCs, which occurred during the fieldwork, were also reviewed. The findings were supplemented by the views of PSNI officers as well as external stakeholders.

4.19 The main findings can be summarised as:

- Designated SIOs not physically attending RTCs scenes (attended in just 40% of case files examined);
- Specialists not attending many RTCs (mappers attended 30% of scenes and FSNI scientists attended 10% of scenes examined). This excludes the four scenes that occurred during the fieldwork;
- Lack of training for investigating officers;
- Lack of audit trail in terms of vehicle examinations;

- Low number of photographs taken at scenes;
- Poor quality witness statements with several based on 'hearsay';
- Evidence trails not fully explored or developed to logical conclusion e.g. forensic leads such as defective tyres not investigated thoroughly to exclude/confirm as potential causation factors; and
- Poor prosecution judgements based on inadequate evidence collection and presentation.

4.20 The main finding of the fieldwork is the poor quality of the evidence being presented to the PPS for criminal prosecutions and to the Coroners for inquest adjudications. This is supported by HM Coroner who has written to the Chief Constable in response to concerns expressed by barristers and families asking why the investigation was not done to the standard that is normal in GB. At the same time, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) has appointed a specialist RTC investigator who is examining complaints from the public. On a more general level, the Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC), which looks at RTCs involving the police in England and Wales, found that there is room for improvement in many investigation reports in their jurisdiction in terms of improving the quality and consistency of the information they provide.

4.21 A consequence of calling different single specialists to RTC scenes is the added time required to complete the investigation. One RP officer who



had visited a force in GB said 'the way we investigate fatalities here is prehistoric!' The 'expert' Inspector who observed a scene found that it took two hours for the full investigation team to assemble before any assistance was provided to the SIO at the scene of a serious RTC. An analysis of four fatal collisions during the fieldwork phase showed that it took on average 8.5 hours to complete the investigation and re-open the roads. It is estimated that similar incidents in England and Wales would have taken about 4-5 hours (based on the assessment of the 'expert' RTC Inspector), when conducted by a specialist integrated crash and collision team. Assuming an average 3.5 hours saving per officer per scene when calculated against the 110 fatal collision scenes in 2006, this would mean 392 officer hours saved per annum (for each officer attending). When injury collision scenes are added, this could rise to thousands of hours per annum (based on 5,518 injury collision scenes in 2006). The cost to both the PSNI and other services, particularly the NIFRS, is both obvious and substantial.

4.22 One of the principal risks associated with poor investigations is that some offences may not be detected/prepared for prosecution and there may be a higher probability of acquittal/reduced charges based on inadequate evidence. Examination of case papers by the two Inspectors confirmed their unequivocal view that current standards of investigation are contributing directly to reduced levels of prosecution (i.e. cases not charged for the most serious offences

and/or cases that could be prosecuted, if the investigation was thorough, not followed-up for prosecution at all).

4.23 Data provided by the PPS for 2006 and 2007 show that the PPS completed 56 prosecutions for dangerous and careless driving of which 44 resulted in a finding of guilt. (see Table 4, Appendix 2). Of these completed prosecutions, a total of 22 related to Causing Death by dangerous driving (20) or Causing Death or Grievous Bodily Injury (GBI) by driving carelessly with excess alcohol (2) (See Appendix 2 Table 4). In 2006 and 2007, 19 people were found guilty of the offence of Causing Death by dangerous driving with sentences ranging from 15 months to 120 months – the average sentence for this offence was 55 months. During the same period, 25 people were found guilty of the offence of Causing GBI by dangerous driving receiving an average sentence of 28 months.

4.24 The prosecution of bad driving, particularly where dangerous/careless driving has resulted in death is a genuine area of concern. The Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales will soon publish a public policy statement on prosecuting bad driving and also provide updated CPS legal guidance. A similar approach is advised for the PPS in Northern Ireland. The NIO has consulted on the draft Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order with proposed new offences for causing death or grievous bodily injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, while unlicensed, while disqualified and



while uninsured. It is likely to be placed before Parliament in the near future.

- 4.25 In view of the serious concerns raised in relation to the investigation of fatal and serious RTCs, the Inspectors are re-stating and re-emphasising the recommendation contained in their Scientific Support Services report of 2006 that the **PSNI should set up a properly resourced unit for fatal and serious vehicle crashes and collisions, to reflect the service that currently exists in Great Britain i.e. a dedicated crash and collision investigation unit. A sufficient number of roads policing staff should be adequately trained in collision investigation, commensurate with training provided in England and Wales and which follows the Association of Chief Police Officers Road Death Investigation Manual.**

**The unit should be fully operational within two years.**

- 4.26 In the interim period, and as a first step towards full implementation of the above recommendation it is recommended that **the formation of a small cadre of highly trained fatal and serious RTC SIOs should be implemented as a priority action.** It is suggested that this could include approximately 10 SIOs (Inspector) to provide 24/7 cover; 30 deputy SIOs at Sergeant level and a total of 12-15 Forensic Collision Investigators trained to GB standards, with staff mandated to attend **all** fatal and life threatening serious injury collisions.

- 4.27 The benefits of implementing a specialist crash and collision unit and developing a cadre of SIOs should include:

- Improved quality of investigations with positive impact on prosecutions and coroner inquests;
- Reduced delays at RTC scenes with positives for all agencies involved and to the general public (earlier re-opening of roads);
- Increased efficiency in terms of the use of existing resources; and
- Opportunities to recover costs through the provision of 'expert' reports to insurers and solicitors on 'full cost recovery terms' (in some force areas in England and Wales fatal and serious RTC case files are supplied to legal representatives pursuing civil action for £5-7,000). These 'costs' are then used to 'fund' the provision of specialist RTC investigation units thereby potentially making these specialist investigation units cost neutral to the public purse).

- 4.28 The PSNI response to these findings is positive with the senior management team agreeing to establish a dedicated collision investigation team. The Service has agreed to identify best practice from other police forces. It is planned that the unit will be operational within two years with appropriate resources and staff, training and policy framework.



# Denying criminals the use of the roads



## Openness and accountability

5.1 Denying criminals the use of the roads is a broad policing objective to which RP is well placed to make a significant contribution. It is RP which is stopping most vehicles, and officers have access to increasingly sophisticated intelligence systems which allows better targeting of specific types of offenders. Research from England and Wales has shown that up to 80% of disqualified drivers have a criminal record while almost half of convicted dangerous drivers have other convictions.

5.2 The evolution of 'traffic' police to 'Roads Policing' is grounded on the premise that a RP function can encompass the traditional traffic responsibilities with those of detecting other crimes. Integrating traffic and tackling crime is a key challenge for the PSNI on two fronts – RP officers often see themselves as traffic and other crime detections are often a by-product while non RP officers are reluctant or not encouraged to get involved in traffic duties. Change is happening, however, as a senior RP officer did comment that 15% of TSG are now on RP and

TSG are actively engaged in RP operations in border areas (though this is mainly to provide a security presence to other police officers).

5.3 Central to the utilisation of RP for crime is the application of the NIM. The NIM uses intelligence to target specific offenders and crimes through effective use of resources. Where appropriate, this will include the utilisation of RP in research, planning, tasking and operations. On occasion, the NIM will be used for specific RP focused operations with priority attached to Levels 2 and 3 crime.<sup>26</sup> RP Inspectors attend DCU Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Groups where they are updated on criminal matters and may be tasked to assist on specific Level 2 operations. In those areas where RP is not on the strategic assessment (e.g. South Belfast), the NIM process will not be used. A DCI Crime Manager in another area confirmed that there is not much tasking of RP units within his DCU.

5.4 Part of the difficulty is that RP does not have a unified approach to its involvement in crime. The RP policy section confirmed that they do not

26 The ACPO Guidance on the NIM (2005) states that it operates at three levels of policing: Level 1 – local crime and disorder; Level 2 – cross border issues affecting more than one district command unit; Level 3 – serious and organised crime usually operating on a national and international scale.



get involved in day-to-day operations aimed at denying criminals the use of the roads. It is the two OCUs that take the lead on this area and the approach is different in each region as the initiative often rests with the respective Chief Inspectors. Some RP officers will therefore be closely involved in DCU led crime operations while others may be peripheral to these activities.

## Technology

- 5.5 One of the key tools to denying criminals the use of the roads is the use of ANPR systems. A set of cameras record the number plates of vehicles and then checks them against databases. This technology was first used by the military and special operations units of various police forces as an intelligence database for tracking specified vehicles (and their users) and in the City of London to reduce the risk of terrorist attack. It was extensively used in Northern Ireland for various intelligence and counter terrorism operations. It has since been modified and further developed by various providers and is used by police forces and many other law enforcement organisations such as the DVA. RP across the UK has been the leading customer in recent years as the benefits of the system for identifying and detecting road traffic offences has become more apparent. The most common databases relate to vehicles owned by disqualified drivers, untaxed vehicles, stolen vehicles and those with no insurance.
- 5.6 The policy context for the use of ANPR is set down in the Directive on

PSNI ANPR systems published in January 2008 which attributes ownership to Crime Operations, Technical Support Unit. It supersedes a Policy Directive of 2006 which was entitled 'Mobile ANPR Systems'. A new ANPR strategy was produced by an external consultancy for the PSNI. The new policy and strategy became necessary as the PSNI took ownership of the fixed ANPR camera system that was previously used by the military. Crime Operations will keep ownership of ANPR until a review is complete.

## ANPR Inhibitors

- 5.7 The issue that is critical to this inspection is whether RP is getting the full benefits of this ANPR technology. Most GB forces had placed ANPR within a RP ownership structure which helps to ensure that RP priorities are targeted through the utilisation of this technology. There is however a noticeable shift in many GB forces towards placing ANPR within the intelligence arena, which is a clear demonstration of its wider use and benefits for policing. ANPR in the PSNI currently sits within the Crime Operations Department to provide information and intelligence to support ongoing operations and investigations. This unit is the central contact for DCUs and RP units and will take responsibility for the review of fixed site locations, identification of new sites and the implementation of the new strategy. The PSNI need to ensure that RP priorities are not marginalised within these shifting arrangements and this should form part of the forthcoming internal review proposed for later this year.

5.8 A second issue relates to the legacy of the fixed camera sites, which formerly were not 'owned' by the PSNI. The Service needs to ensure that merging these sites with their own structure does not inhibit the effective use of the system as a whole. ACPO want to see a wider use of the technology in mainstream policing and Inspectors support this objective.

5.9 As plans to expand the coverage of fixed and mobile camera coverage (300 cameras at 116 fixed sites are in a new business plan) are developed, there is a need to make a significant investment in back office support for ANPR. The fixed and mobile systems are not compatible at present and achieving greater cohesion will require additional resources. A lack of investment at this stage will result in a system which will quickly become ineffective and inefficient.

5.10 The credibility of the ANPR system is founded on the accuracy of its databases. The principal source of DCU information is via the Integrated Criminal Information System (ICIS), which is not subject to management control and data can be out of date. The use of Police National Computer (PNC) data would be better as will be the new Niche Records Management System when it is fully operational. Inspectors were also told of concerns regarding existing databases such as the Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) evasion data from DVA which is considered to be inaccurate in many cases. Officers recounted occasions when drivers were stopped when alerted by ANPR only to be

told that their vehicles were now taxed. This is undermining the credibility of officers and the continued use of this database will require changes to business processes and the availability of more accurate and live data. ANPR is also inhibited by a lack of data on the system – the most obvious omission relates to no insurance data which is readily available in England and Wales. Inspectors were told that access to the MIB database requires some legislative and technical changes. Local intelligence also needs to be updated onto ANPR as Inspectors were informed that full details of criminals in some parts of NI were not recorded on the system.

5.11 Realising the benefits of ANPR may require dedicated intercept teams at DCU level. Fixed sites can produce an immediate alert but this will rarely result in an immediate response.

5.12 A final issue relates to the dependence of the system on compliance with number plate registration. Attempts to modify registration plates will weaken the impact of ANPR. There is a need for the PSNI to robustly enforce the legal configuration of registration marks otherwise the benefits of the system will not be achieved. This may also require a change in the seriousness of the offence accompanied by the rigorous rescinding of non-compliant registration marks, often used by persistent offenders. Statistics provided by the PSNI for 2006 show that there were 1,814 FPNs for registration plate violations.<sup>27</sup>

27 This breaks down as 1,469 for incorrect form of registration mark, 254 for no number plate and 91 for obscured number plate.



## Partnership

- 5.13 A UK government minister recently told a gathering of RP officers that 'Roads Policing is not a stand alone activity'. Effective RP requires closer integration with other policing activities and needs to be delivered in partnership with a range of law enforcement and regulatory bodies.
- 5.14 Evidence of a more joined-up approach is provided by the increasing number of joint operations which can involve different police forces and/or other LEAs. Initiatives which are part of a calendar of international crime enforcement include *Operation Mermaid* (dangerous vehicles), *Operation Dabblor* (disqualified drivers involved in crime) and *Operation Rurisk* (motorcaravan crime and stolen vehicles). These operations are often led by RP officers within the PSNI and involve DoE, HMRC and others.
- 5.15 There is also evidence of a more joined-up approach to tackling locally identified crime concerns. A multi-agency task group has been established which has membership from most of the local LEAs. A meeting is held once per month to plan and organise operations which may be bi-lateral or multi-agency. For example, bi-lateral operations involving the PSNI and DoE are common in areas such as illegal taxi and bus enforcement. Multi-agency operations may involve roadside checks conducted by three or more separate agencies. The feedback from other LEAs is that these joint operations are useful and productive in terms of detections and prosecutions.
- 5.16 A high profile local initiative is *Operation Clean-Up* which operated in the Greater Belfast area to tackle the problems of unlicensed vehicles and their use for anti-social behaviour. It involved the NIO, PSNI, DoE and Belfast City Council through the identification, collection and disposal of unlicensed and run-around vehicles.
- 5.17 There are however some weaknesses to closer co-operation which were covered in some detail by CJI in its report on enforcement in the DoE. These include:
- Sensitivities on data protection which is restricting the sharing of information. The Information Commissioner has provided assurance when data is 'needed to prevent or detect a crime, or catch and prosecute a suspect'.
  - Lack of priority accorded to joint operations in strategic and business planning which can lead to diminished or cancelled operations – some joint operations are cancelled at the last minute when one partner withdraws. The DVA estimated that 15-20% of operations are cancelled, mostly by DCUs due to competing demands at local level.
  - Inadequate framework for co-operation which can lead to misunderstandings in terms of planning and delivery.
  - Learning opportunities not fully utilised through inadequate debriefing and assessment of joint operations.
- 5.18 CJI in its report on enforcement in the DoE supported the further development of joined-up enforcement and recommended **a**



**structured framework of SLAs, MoUs, protocols and bi-lateral agreements should be put in place for the strengthening of partnerships within the DoE family, other LEAs and with similar cross-jurisdictional organisations in GB and the Rol.** Difficulties on sharing of data should not act as a deterrent to more effective planning and delivery of joint operations.

### Cross Border Co-operation

- 5.19 Crime is not bound by administrative or territorial borders. Indeed, there is clear evidence from the NI/Rol border that criminals are using the boundary as a means of expanding criminal activities and evading detection and prosecution. The CJI report on enforcement in the DoE referred to the increasingly lucrative and illegal cross border disposal of waste. Differences in legislation, taxes etc has also facilitated the illegal transport of fuel across border roads. RP is well placed to tackle crime which is dependent on the use of the roads. But tackling border related crime requires a supportive political and legislative environment together with high levels of co-operation between police and LEAs in both jurisdictions.
- 5.20 The international context for cross border policing and law enforcement is the Schengen agreement, which has not reached its potential due to various disagreements among EU Member States. There is however a strong commitment by the UK and Irish Governments to tackling cross-border crime.

5.21 Inspectors found significant bi-lateral co-operation between the PSNI and An Garda Síochána in terms of RP. While there has been some co-operation and sharing of intelligence for many years, the improved political environment has now provided a big impetus at strategic and tactical (operational) levels. The nature of this co-operation is covered in Chapter 2 of this report.

- 5.22 There are some areas which require attention:
- Sharing of intelligence and data with Rol and UK LEAs is restricted particularly in relation to data from the ANPR fixed sites; and
  - The cross border exchange of data on stolen vehicles has not changed for many years and data exchange is slow due to the use of out-dated technology used to transfer it. By the time it is put on ANPR, it can already be 'out of date'.

### Learning and best practice

- 5.23 Denying criminals the use of the roads is at a more advanced stage in England and Wales where many forces have achieved better integration of traffic and crime functions and where ANPR is used extensively by RP officers to detect criminal activity. There is therefore scope for the PSNI to learn lessons from this experience and incorporate this in planning and operations.
- 5.24 Inspectors have formed the view that the PSNI is still some way behind the best practice established in RP in England and Wales. Further there is insufficient evidence that this best practice is informing current policy



and operational decisions in the use of ANPR. Inspectors therefore recommend that as a matter of urgency **the PSNI should seek to update their ANPR strategy to reflect best practice developed in England and Wales** and the findings of the various ANPR reviews undertaken on behalf of the Home Office.<sup>28</sup> The PSNI should then seek to implement and deliver against this strategy.

- 5.25 Delivering an improved RP service on crime will require effective training for officers. One senior officer stated that ‘a lot of RP officers are afraid of getting too involved in crime matters and the majority would not have the confidence or knowledge required... fear factor involved especially when it comes to a PACE<sup>29</sup> search’. Improved training is the means to address this fear and reluctance and improve overall performance. PSNI statistics show a link between RP crime detections and those who have experience from a Crime Team or TSG. Inspectors found that there is no real marketing of the benefits of ANPR with key staff such as SIOs and many DCU staff do not fully understand the capabilities of the ANPR system. Key intelligence databases such as the Police Intelligence Kommercial Enquiry (PIKE) system are not well known within RP despite the fact that intelligence is disseminated to OCU Operational Planning and RPU officers. The Policing Board report on NIM recommended training of

more RPU staff in PIKE.

- 5.26 Inspectors found a positive situation in relation to the authorisation and management of police pursuits. Pursuit is high risk which requires a balance between preventing crime and wider public safety. A new policy was introduced by the PSNI in early 2007 based on ACPO guidance and training for specialist staff is ongoing. Inspectors were informed that the whole Service are aware of their role and obligations should a pursuit commence.

## Results

- 5.27 The performance of RP in denying criminals the use of the roads is mixed as not all of this activity is measured or attributable to RP or individual officers. Performance management systems are being developed and modified and it is important that this type of output is measured and assessed by supervisors and senior managers in RP.
- 5.28 One of the main problems is that the impact of ANPR for RP may be under reported. Non fixed site ANPR data is generally not attributable as the source of detection as there is only one closing code for arrest and this is unlikely to be attributed to the system. Officers are told that ANPR detections (e.g. no tax) should not be submitted on form 55/5a as the only source of a detection (ANPR policy) as PSNI mobile ANPR is not to the

28 See Evaluation of ANPR, April 2007 and Thematic review of the use of ANPR within police forces, January 2007, undertaken by PA Consulting Group.

29 PACE refers to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act which provides a core framework of police powers and safeguards around stop and search, arrest, detention, investigation, identification and interviewing detainees.



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evidential standard of DVAs ANPR devices, which are Home Office type approved. Information gathered from the fixed ANPR sites is treated as intelligence and not used for evidence purposes such as road traffic offences.

- 5.29 There is also evidence from a RP Constable that elements of the ANPR system are prone to defects and insufficient budget for spare parts meaning that it can be off-line for a lengthy period of time. Poor quality data also means that RP officers are inclined to use other forms of intelligence. Inspectors were told that the best performing officers in relation to disqualified drivers are those who use ICIS system and local briefings and not ANPR as there is a view that ‘disqualified drivers’ vehicles are not as reliable on the ANPR system. The lack of dedicated intercept teams in the DCUs means that much intelligence (hits) is not acted-upon. All of these issues contribute to a lack of effectiveness of ANPR.



# Traffic management



## Openness and accountability

6.1 Effective traffic management is necessary to ensuring the free flow of traffic and help prevent collisions as well as anti-social use of the roads. The responsibility for traffic management now rests with a number of public and private organisations, though the police continue to have a key role by virtue of legislation and their presence on the roads. But that role appears to be diminishing – one DCU Commander stated that ‘traffic flow is not core business’, and senior management have confirmed that the service has no statutory obligation in respect of general traffic management.

6.2 Part of the thinking that traffic flow is not core business is the increasing trend towards the decriminalisation of certain traffic offences. Parking enforcement used to be undertaken by PSNI traffic wardens who issued fixed penalty notices that were processed through the PSNI FPPC. The traffic wardens also had power to direct traffic. The decriminalisation of parking offences and the privatisation of the service means that the police no longer have a direct involvement. But a problem

has emerged – the DRD contract with the private provider does not contain a responsibility to direct traffic. A void has emerged as it is unclear where responsibility now rests. The issue of traffic flow is further complicated by the views of other stakeholders who claim that clearways are not enforced by the PSNI and that bus lane infringements are too easily tolerated. Translink expressed concerns about the lack of enforcement of bus lanes in Belfast, though PSNI claimed that 584 FPNs were issued for Breach of Traffic Sign (Bus Lane) in Belfast during 2007. This is an issue which will need to be highlighted as discussions continue in relation to the next phase of privatisation (i.e. moving traffic offences including unlawfully driving in a bus lane).

6.3 The PSNI response is that all officers can direct and regulate traffic though they are not keen to assume primary responsibility. The PSNI has written to the DRD to strongly recommend that Traffic Attendants be given the power to direct traffic but this was rejected on the basis that no Traffic Attendants in GB had such a power. In the absence of agreement, it is the view of Inspectors that the PSNI should take overall responsibility for



directing traffic and that all officers are aware of their responsibility. An interesting finding is that the vast majority of complaints to Strandtown PSNI relate to parking rather than RTCs or speeding.

6.4 The PSNI has responsibility through various pieces of legislation to close roads in circumstances such as an RTC, public safety, band parades and sporting events. Any road closure will seriously impact on traffic flow and the consequences can be severe when main arterial routes are closed during times of heavy traffic. The recent closures of the M1 and the M2/M5 due to RTCs led to major traffic congestion across much of Belfast and had serious financial impact on many businesses. It also raised serious concerns for the movement of the emergency services. Inspectors accept that road closures for unforeseen events such as RTCs have to be balanced against an obligation to conduct a full investigation (refer to chapter on investigation). It is the PSNI which has operational responsibility for the timing of re-opening of roads in these circumstances.

6.5 There are some measures which can be taken to alleviate traffic flow:

- Implementation of the recommendation on a specialist crash and collision unit is likely to result in a reduction in delays for RTC investigations;
- Less involvement in minor damage only collisions. It is the view of a key stakeholder that the PSNI is spending too much time at minor collisions where there is a reluctance to get vehicles off the road. PSNI officers

should only attend minor 'damage only' collision scenes where the location of the vehicles is causing danger to other road users. Their 'only' responsibility once in attendance should be to 'clear' the scene to alleviate the danger i.e. they are not required or expected to undertake any form of investigation of cause which, currently, generally is done purely to the benefit of insurance companies and not for the public interest. Evidence of increased reporting of such collisions as an injury RTC or an allegation that the other driver has consumed alcohol or drugs in order to secure police attendance at the scene should be assessed and addressed through new policy if required.

- Dissemination of the recently prepared 'Joint Protocol for the Management of Major/Critical Incidents on the Strategic Road Network (Belfast Urban Region)'.

6.6 Planned road closures require a higher level of transparency and justification where the benefits (e.g. public safety, tourism) can be balanced against the costs (e.g. delayed journey times, impact on businesses). The decision to close the two south bound lanes of the A1 for an entire day to facilitate guest parking at a garden party in Hillsborough is a case in point.

### Partnership

6.7 It is RP which deals with the consequences of transport and infrastructure planning. A good transport system with alternative forms of transport will require less intervention from RP in terms of



traffic management/flow. Conversely, under-investment or short term planning will require more RP intervention through dealing with the consequences of congestion. Longer term planning for transport is the primary responsibility for government and policy makers but RP should have an input in terms of the likely impact on enforcement as well as facilitating measures such as the provision of off road zones for police and other LEA vehicles.

- 6.8 Traffic management is a multi-agency responsibility with responsibilities split between DRD, DoE and the PSNI. It also involves many stakeholder organisations such as Translink, the emergency services, Belfast City Management, motoring organisations and private businesses. An example of this type of partnership is the decision by Belfast businesses through Belfast City Management to contribute to two city beat officer's salaries.

### Learning and best practice

- 6.9 The decision by the PSNI to appoint a Bronze Commander to manage the wider implications of any road closures (separately from the investigation process) is evidence of learning from recent events.

### Results


- 6.10 The success of improved co-ordination and priority towards traffic management has not been tested through a major incident as yet. The benefits of a more effective and efficient approach to RTC investigation will take longer to accrue.
- 6.11 It is recommended that **the partner organisations for the Road Safety Strategy should renew their policies on traffic management and implement co-ordination arrangements to manage the free flow of traffic for planned and spontaneous road closures.**



Section



# Appendices



## Appendix 1: Methodology

The inspection commenced in the summer of 2007. The key aims of the inspection were to:

- Assess the contribution of enforcement and education in improving road safety with particular focus on the PSNI and the DoE (including the DVA);
- Examine the organisational positioning and priority of roads policing within the PSNI;
- Examine the policies and procedures for roads policing with specific reference to the investigation of fatal and serious road traffic collisions and assess the learning capacity, training and use of best practice;
- Assess the extent to which PSNI comply with ACPO guidance on roads policing;
- Examine the operational management of traffic flow with particular reference to the main arterial routes;
- Map the current use of technology in enforcement including new opportunities;
- Assess the contribution of roads policing and enforcement to denying criminals the use of the roads; and
- Explore current levels of partnership with the Republic of Ireland including opportunities for learning and use of best practice.

The inspection was carried out in four phases:

1. Research and review of documentation;
2. Self Assessment;
3. Fieldwork; and
4. Feedback and refinement.

### 1. Research and review of documentation

The preparation stage involved a review of all available documentation and statistics on roads policing. This included:

- Research, studies, inspections and reports on roads policing in Northern Ireland and neighbouring jurisdictions;
- Reports of the European Union, United Nations and World Health Organisation in improving road safety;
- Documentation and statistics from PSNI and the DoE on roads policing (enforcement and education);
- Conducting exploratory meetings with key roads policing and enforcement staff; and
- Arranging meeting(s) with the Garda Síochána Inspectorate to discuss co-ordinated and co-operative arrangements for the two inspections.



## **2. Self Assessment**

The PSNI were requested to undertake an assessment of roads policing which was subsequently used to inform the fieldwork.

A DVA self assessment from the CJI Inspection of Enforcement in the DoE was also used as a reference point.

## **3. Fieldwork**

Fieldwork was carried out during September – October of 2007. This involved meetings and focus groups with staff of all grades within the PSNI and the DVA.

A broad range of stakeholders within and outside the criminal justice system were also consulted during this phase of the inspection.

## **4. Feedback and refinement**


Following the conclusion of the fieldwork, Inspectors provided preliminary feedback to the senior management team in the PSNI.

The draft final report was sent to the PSNI and the DoE in early February with a factual accuracy check completed by the end of the month.



## Appendix 2: Data

Figure 1: KSIs from Road Traffic Collisions 1997/98 – 2006/07.



**Table 1: Number of PSNI prosecutions for driving offences between 2003-2007.**

Prosecutions	2003	%	2004	%	2005	%	2006	%	2007	%
Excess Speed	2751	9	3068	7	3589	8	3894	8	6440	15
Dangerous Driving	392	1	886	2	898	2	1108	2	999	2
Careless Driving	1413	5	5614	13	4514	10	5139	11	5383	12
Breach of Signs/Signals	190	1	852	2	960	2	1467	3	892	2
Construction & Use	837	3	1711	4	1445	3	1294	3	869	2
Lighting Offences	115	0	711	2	1076	2	831	2	861	2
Pedestrians	260	1	86	0	74	0	84	0	38	0
Miscellaneous	17787	61	15703	36	14306	32	15579	33	12267	28
Pedal Cyclists	2	0	62	0	33	0	59	0	29	0
Tachographs	2043	7	546	1	471	1	654	1	386	1
Form T6 issued	0	0	234	1	320	1	214	0	127	0
Form T6/1 issued	0	0	47	0	72	0	70	0	47	0
Form 55/10 issued	0	0	1254	3	1491	3	1713	4	961	2
No Seat Belt - Front	674	2	1411	3	1308	3	1473	3	2326	5
No Seat Belt - Rear	19	0	77	0	49	0	60	0	94	0
No Seat Belt - Child (front)	8	0	71	0	38	0	48	0	56	0
No Seat Belt - Child (rear)	33	0	77	0	44	0	45	0	56	0
Driving whilst disqualified	0	0	1368	3	1432	3	1357	3	1061	2
No Insurance	0	0	5385	12	6743	15	6976	15	5182	12
Number of Field Impairment Tests Conducted	0	0	25	0	81	0	112	0	99	0
Unfit Through Drink / Drugs	769	3	1355	3	1629	4	1357	3	1205	3
PBT (positive or unable/ refused) (not collision related)	1533	5	2423	6	2770	6	2812	6	2886	7
PBT* (positive or unable/ refused) (collision related)	534	2	682	2	753	2	874	2	1026	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>29360</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>43648</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>44096</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>47220</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>43290</b>	<b>100</b>



**Table 2: Number of PSNI fixed penalty figures for driving offences between 2003-2007.**

Fixed Penalty Figures	2003	%	2004	%	2005	%	2006	%	2007	%
Excess Speed	21987	44	18139	31	21293	33	21697	32	29380	40
Fixed Site Safety Camera	0	0	5202	9	3601	6	3050	4	3992	5
Dangerous Driving	0	0	5	0	15	0	2	0	2	0
Careless Driving	609	1	1385	2	2067	3	2216	3	2738	4
Breach of Signs/Signals	5164	10	1909	3	22	0	19	0	25	0
Construction & Use	1143	2	3451	6	2482	4	3076	4	3863	5
Lighting Offences	1268	3	1448	2	1660	3	1702	2	2303	3
Pedestrians	40	0	59	0	48	0	119	0	116	0
Miscellaneous	524	1	684	1	548	1	1143	2	1540	2
Pedal Cyclists	9	0	97	0	24	0	47	0	33	0
Tachographs	1013	2	303	1	97	0	76	0	167	0
Misuse of Mobile Phones	0	0	6632	11	14953	23	19074	28	14803	20
No Seat Belt - Adult	17026	34	19090	32	16848	26	15559	23	13422	18
No Seat Belt - Child Under 12yrs	24	0	81	0	77	0	96	0	99	0
No Seat Belt - Child (front)	314	1	292	0	286	0	364	1	90	0
No Seat Belt - Child (rear)	502	1	626	1	469	1	231	0	149	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>49623</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>59403</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>64490</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>68471</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>72722</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 3: Adult magistrate's court disposals for motoring offences between 2003-2006\*.**

Magistrates court disposals	2003	%	2004	%	2005	%	2006	%	Total	%
Prison (Immediate)	2096	3	2098	3	1547	2	723	2	6464	3
Prison (Suspended)	1140	2	1319	2	1264	2	671	2	4394	2
Enforced Prison (Suspended)	98	0	219	0	106	0	38	0	461	0
Community Service Order	362	1	336	0	251	0	137	0	1086	0
Fine	33869	51	37174	52	32463	51	17948	49	121454	51
Absolute Discharge	375	1	398	1	289	0	157	0	1219	1
Conditional Discharge	1509	2	1165	2	930	1	464	1	4068	2
Probation	527	1	590	1	640	1	344	1	2101	1
Combination Order	71	0	103	0	60	0	37	0	271	0
Custody Probation Order	4	0	7	0	3	0	3	0	17	0
Disqualification	12976	19	14785	21	13157	21	6990	19	47908	20
Bound Over to Keep the Peace	24	0	23	0	24	0	18	0	89	0
Compensation Order	145	0	178	0	147	0	150	0	620	0
Penalty Points	8695	13	8710	12	7825	12	4936	13	30166	13
Endorsement Order	1706	3	2514	4	2221	3	1037	3	7478	3
Other	3284	5	1738	2	2630	4	3127	9	10779	5
<b>Total Number of sentences</b>	<b>66881</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>71357</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>63557</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>36780</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>238575</b>	<b>100</b>

\*Figures relate to the total number of sentences imposed, they are not defendant based.



**Table 4: Dangerous and careless driving cases closed by the PSS in 2006 & 2007**

<b>Primary Offence</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>Total</b>
Causing Death by Dangerous Driving	6	14	20
Causing Death or GBI by driving carelessly with excess alcohol	1	1	2
Aggravated Vehicle taking causing GBI/Death	0	0	0
Causing GBI by Dangerous Driving	6	25	31
Causing GBI by Driving Carelessly with Excess alcohol	1	1	2
Causing GBI by driving carelessly when unfit	0	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>56</b>

Source: Data provided by the PPS in April 2008

Section



# Response to recommendations



## A: PSNI Action Plan

**Ownership and strategic leadership for Roads Policing should rest with one ACC with continuity in tactical command through a dedicated and experienced Chief Superintendent who is centrally based and supported by a broad based experienced management team. Policy and operations should be combined.**

On Friday 8 February 2008 the Chief Constable and the Senior Management Team met to discuss the 'Phase 1 Headquarters and Regions Review'.

One of the decisions made at this meeting was that Roads Policing is to be centralised under one unit and sit within the Operational Support Department under the strategic leadership of ACC Operational Support. This will bring together the policy and operations functions of Roads Policing into one unit and will be in place from 1 April 2009.

**The PSNI should implement the Association of Chief Police Officers advised speed thresholds.**

March 2008	Continuous Improvement Unit (CIU) publish their overview of the Fixed Penalty Processing Centre.
June 2008	Reduce speed enforcement threshold.
March 2009	Implement recommendations of CIU overview of FPPC.
June 2009	Reduce speed enforcement threshold.
April 2010	Subject to there being sufficient capacity in FPPC, implement ACPO Speed Enforcement Guidelines.

**A lowering of the drink drive limit should be simultaneously introduced on both sides of the border.**

This recommendation is a matter for the respective governments in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.



**The joint PSNI/An Garda Síochána protocol should be used to enhance the co-operation and communication at operational level and facilitate sharing of information for roads policing purposes.**

- The strategic meetings between PSNI Road Policing Development and An Garda Síochána National Traffic Bureau to take place twice per year.
- Operational meetings between PSNI Rural Region Road Policing and An Garda Síochána Northern Division Traffic Corps to take place on a monthly basis.
- PSNI and An Garda Síochána to continue with programme of Road Policing personnel exchanges.
- PSNI and An Garda Síochána to continue involvement in TISPOL operations.
- PSNI and An Garda Síochána to review opportunities for enhanced information sharing between the two police services on road policing issues by March 2009.

**PSNI should set up a properly resourced unit for fatal and serious vehicle crashes and collisions, to reflect the service that currently exists in Great Britain i.e. a dedicated crash and collision investigation unit. A sufficient number of roads policing staff should be adequately trained in collision investigation, commensurate with training provided in England and Wales and which follows the Association of Chief Police Officers Road Death Investigation Manual. The unit should be fully operational within two years.**

October 2008	Complete research into operation of Collision Investigation Unit and good practice in Great Britain.
April 2009	Appoint officers to PSNI Collision Investigation Unit and commence training.
October 2009	Collision Investigation Unit in place to shadow work of PSNI RTC Investigation and Reconstruction Unit.
April 2010	PSNI Collision Investigation Unit fully operational.

**The formation of a small cadre of highly trained fatal and serious Road Traffic Collision Senior Investigating Officers should be implemented as a priority action.**

June 2008	PSNI to identify cadre of SIOs for Road Death Investigations.
March 2009	Cadre of Road Death SIOs to be accredited to PIP Level 2.





**The PSNI should seek to update their ANPR strategy to reflect best practice developed in England and Wales.**

Ongoing	PSNI will continue to attend National ANPR User Group meetings.
October 2008	PSNI complete benchmarking of use of ANPR technology in Great Britain. PSNI continue to work with NPIA Implementation Team.

**The partner organisations for the Road Safety Strategy should renew their policies on traffic management and implement co-ordination arrangements to manage the free flow of traffic for planned and spontaneous road closures.**

June 2008	PSNI Road Policing and DRD Roads Service to review 'Joint Protocol for the Management of Major/Critical Incidents on the Strategic Network (Belfast Urban Region)'.
October 2008	PSNI Road Policing and DRD Roads Service to review policies on traffic management and co-ordination arrangements in respect of the Rural Region.
March 2009	Introduce 'Joint Protocol for the Management of Major/Critical Incidents on the Strategic Road Network (Rural Region)'.

**A formal protocol should be agreed between the SPD and the PSNI.**

PSNI Scientific Support Manager to meet with State Pathologist with a view of having draft protocol agreed and signed at the earliest opportunity.



## B: DoE Action Plan

**The DoE should develop and publish a clear statement of intent on enforcement in relation to any breaches and/or offences of road traffic law. This should be incorporated into the DoE and DVA Corporate and Business Plans.**

The DoE and DVA will develop appropriate statements for inclusion in Corporate and Business Plans. These will be included within the DVA Corporate and Business Plan 2008-09 and 2009-11.

**An integrated enforcement unit should be established within the DVA.**

Enforcement and Compliance of Road Freight Operator and Vehicle Licensing and Taxi and Bus Operator and Vehicle Licensing have been integrated under a single Grade 7 and are represented by a Grade 6 Group Director at the DVA Strategic Board. Vehicle Excise Duty enforcement is the responsibility of DVLA under the terms of the Agency Agreement between DoE and DfT.

**A performance management framework should be developed to ensure that enforcement operations meet strategic objectives. The framework should include policies; procedures; risk analysis; and SMART performance targets. Clear procedures must be in place to ensure the independence of the regulatory function so that enforcement staff are not subject to political and other internal/external pressures.**

DVA Enforcement Strategy will be reviewed and updated to include a performance management framework which will cover policies, procedures, risk analysis and performance targets. This can be set out in the 'statement of intent'.

Operational performance measures have been revised and will be implemented with effect from 1 May 2008. Strategic objectives to reduce non-compliance have been set and will be measured during the biennial surveys scheduled for 2009. The development of a categorisation of offences and defects manual will be undertaken with the recruitment of specialist staff in June 2008.



**As part of its ongoing re-organisation, the DVA should review the existing administrative systems and processes for compliance and enforcement and develop a set of procedures and processes to produce a more streamlined and efficient service.**

Staff review will be completed to determine the correct staffing structure in terms of grade and numbers to deliver the required performance targets. Processes will be reviewed and updated to enable delivery of a more efficient service.

Proposals to undertake a Compliance, Enforcement and Licensing Directorate staffing and structural review has commenced with a draft set of terms of reference with TUS for consideration. It is envisaged the actual review will be undertaken during the summer of 2008.

**Enforcement staff should receive training, work experience, job shadowing and skill enhancement to deliver the required standards. It will also require new staff to be selected and recruited to fill gaps in areas such as criminal investigations and the broader strategic management of enforcement.**

DVA Enforcement Officers already undertake a comprehensive training regime when recruited and have an ongoing programme of specialist and technical training courses to complete. All enforcement officers are required to attain the Advanced Certificate in Investigative Practice (NVQ Level 5). A staff review will be completed to determine the correct staffing structure in terms of grade and numbers to deliver the required performance targets and ensure that the broader strategic management of enforcement is effectively resourced.

This is ongoing. A comprehensive induction package will be developed for all new staff being recruited for September-October 2008.

**A structured framework of SLAs, MoUs, protocols and bi-lateral agreements should be put in place for the strengthening of partnerships within the DoE family, other LEAs and with similar cross-jurisdictional organisations in GB and the RoI.**

At present the DVA have MoUs with ACPO and EHS. It is recognised that further strengthening of partnerships is required and work is ongoing in developing a Universal Information Sharing Protocol Template. A draft of this has been developed and is currently awaiting approval by Departmental Solicitors.

To be completed by September 2008.



**The DVA should establish effective mechanisms to draw upon and learn from best practice on enforcement.**

The DVA recently participated in the European Enforcement Harmonisation Project. Enforcement Officers will be attending future exchanges and will also contribute to providing training and awareness of enforcement practices in NI. Feedback from this work will be used in the review of our Enforcement Strategy. The DVA are represented at the Multi Agency Enforcement Task Force Forum and meet regularly with VOSA and PSNI policy representatives to discuss best practice. Further development work is required with RoI.

This is ongoing.









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